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In the literature of data mining, many different solutions for mining anomalies 
and privacy preservation have been proposed. However, there is relatively 
little study on some special problems, such as how to monitor anomalies over 
trajectory streams and how to preserve privacy for serial data publishing. In 
this thesis two of the data mining problems - (1) trajectory stream anomaly 
monitoring problem and (2) privacy preserving serial data publishing problem 
-are investigated. 
Anomaly Monitoring: Lately there exist increasing demands on online 
abnormality monitoring over trajectory streams, obtained from moving ob-
ject tracking devices. This problem is challenging due to the requirement of 
high speed data processing and limited space cost. W e present a novel frame-
work for monitoring anomalies over continuous trajectory streams. First, we 
illustrate the importance of distance-based anomaly monitoring over moving 
object trajectories. Then, we utilize the local continuity characteristics of 
trajectories and build local clusters upon trajectory streams. Pruning strate-
gies are established to efficiently monitor anomalies. W e further propose a 
i 
piecewise metric index structure to reschedule the joining order of local clus-
ters to reduce the time cost. In addition, we use an upper bound lemma to 
extend the basic solutions for dynamic time warping distance. Our exten-
sive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed 
methods. 
Privacy Preservation: Previous works about privacy preserving serial 
data publishing on dynamic databases have relied on unrealistic assumptions 
of the nature of dynamic databases. Thus, the solutions could not guaran-
tee privacy in a more realistic setting. In many applications, some sensitive 
values change freely while others never change. For example, in medical ap-
plications, the disease attribute changes with time when patients recover from 
one disease and develop another disease. However, patients do not recover 
from some diseases such as HIV. W e call such diseases permanent sensitive 
values. Other than the data to be published, the publicly available tables 
such as the registration lists may also change. To the best of our knowl-
edge, none of the existing solutions handle these realistic issues. W e propose 
a novel anonymization approach called HD-composition to solve the above 
problems. Extensive experiments with real data demonstrate the necessity 
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Rapid advances in data collection and storage technology have enabled orga-
nizations to accumulate vast amounts of data. Data mining is a technology 
that blends traditional data analysis methods with sophisticated algorithms 
for processing large volumes of data. In this introductory chapter, we discuss 
the motivations and contributions for the two problems in data mining we 
study respectively. 
1.1 Anomaly Monitoring 
Recently, trajectory mining has attracted much attention due to its wide 
applications, especially in context-aware computing environment. Many re-
search works have been conducted for trajectory clustering [28] and classi-
fication [16]. Sometimes abnormal trajectories tend to carry the critical in-
formation of potential problems which require immediate attention and need 
be resolved at an early stage. There are many applications that require real-
time monitoring of abnormal sequential patterns over streaming trajectories 
obtained from mobile tracking devices. Examples include elder care, child 
1 
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custody, accurate mobile localization, automatic driving and so on. Below 
are two motivating examples about the necessity to detect anomalies over 
trajectory streams. 
E x a m p l e 1 Many senior citizens require constant monitoring and care but 
such care is expensive without an automatic process. Thus to continuously 
monitor anomalies of their trajectory streams generated from mobile tracking 
devices will be very useful, especially when they go outdoor. Such anomalies 
may indicate events such as taking a wrong bus, having a bad fall) encoun-
tering a sudden slow-down or getting lost. If their families could be notified 
in time, immediate and possibly life-saving actions can be taken. Figure 1.1 
describes a typical scenario: Bob's father takes a strange detour (the red tra-
jectory b) compared to his normal route (the blue trajectory a); then Bob is 
notified immediately about this abnormal case. 
E x a m p l e 2 Nowadays, most road traffic devices like cars, buses and trucks 
have be installed with GPS systems. Therefore, their trajectory streams can 
be continuously monitored by a central system. Once there are some emergent 
accidents, the trajectories of those traffic devices may become abnormal. If 
those trajectory anomalies are captured by the monitoring system in a short 
time, some immediate and powerful solutions could be conducted to handle 
the accidents in time. 
There are some nice solutions for problems like online event [55，19], 
burst [56，46], and novelty detection [33] over stream time series, where the re-
spective definitions of anomalies are: 1) distribution variations from assumed 
distribution, 2) bursts with statistical aggregations exceeding a threshold, and 
3) abnormal classes by classification based on labeled data. Unfortunately, 
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none of the solutions for these anomalies could be extended to find more gen-
eral anomalies for a great number of applications. In the 2 examples described 
above, the anomalies are rare patterns which would have big spatial devia-
tions (distances) from the normal trajectories in some temporal interval, like 
the red trajectory in Figure 1.1(a). The one having a dip in Figure 1.2(a)^(the 
bottom one is zoomed visualization of the top one) is also an example of gen-
eral anomalies, which is manually identified in some spaceshuttle data [23 . 
Figure 1.2(b) depicts the burst which is a special form of general anomalies. 
Moreover, knowing a fixed data distribution (distribution family) on evolving 
trajectories is not realistic and labeled data are not always available. 
Thus, in this thesis, we would like to focus on detecting distance-based 
anomalies from trajectory streams, where distance is used as a measure of 
dissimilarity between trajectory subsequences. Obviously, using distance to 
measure abnormality, both spatial deviations like the ones in Figure 1.2(a) 
and special ones like bursts as in Figure 1.2(b) could be successfully captured. 
In fact, the usefulness of distance-based anomalies for general databases has 
been thoroughly justified by previous works [25] and [26 . 
Though distance-based anomalies are more general and effective, the per-
formance of anomaly monitoring suffers from intensive distance computa-
tions, thus efficient pruning strategies become essential for streaming cases. 
Flirt her more, targeting mobile applications, the proposed algorithm should 
require little additional memory. Naive solutions like sequential scan will 
result in excessive time cost, while R-tree styled structures will incur huge 
memory consumptions for indexing subsequences extracted from a trajectory, 
concomitant with high update cost. Even with dimensionality reduction, the 
reduced representation for every subsequence will occupy k additional mem-
I^n later figures of this thesis, the axis "relative position" denotes the relative time click. 
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Figure 1.1: An Elder Monitoring Application 
ory units than the original stream data, where k is the dimensionality after 
reduction. Therefore it is a challenging problem to tame the computation and 
memory costs of distance-based anomaly detection on trajectory streams. In 
this thesis, we make the following contributions: 
• Problem Statement of Trajectory Stream Anomalies: to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first work that takes note of the importance of 
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distance-based anomaly over trajectory streams based on a sliding win-
dow model. The sliding window model allows us to phase out the effect 
of old data since in many applications the data patterns or anomalies are 
changing and only the more recent patterns are interested by the mining 
task at hand. 
• Efficient Anomaly Monitoring by Local Clusters., w e build local clusters 
for trajectories in a streaming manner, then anomalies are detected by an 
efficient cluster join mechanism using powerful pruning strategies without 
introducing false dismissals. 
• Piecewise Index for Rescheduling Cluster Join., to further improve the per-
formance, we design a piecewise VP-tree based index structure to allow 
rescheduling of the join order. 
• Experimental Study: we test the proposed techniques on real world as well 
as synthetic data. The results show that our anomaly definition is much 
more useful than other known definitions and our techniques can achieve 
orders of magnitude improvement in performance compared to a simple 
pruning approach. 
1.2 Privacy Preservation 
Data mining on databases is quite useful. However, publishing data related 
to individuals to public may compromise individual privacy. For example, 
a hospital may release patient diagnosis records so that data analysts and 
researchers can study the characteristics of various diseases. The raw data, 
also called microdata, contain the identities of individuals such as names 
or keys which should not be released in order to protect individual privacy. 
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However, if an adversary has access to the publicly available voter registration 
list^ , s/he can discover a large portion of patients' identities by joining the 
published table and the voter registration list on some attributes such as Age, 
Sex and Zipcode, which are called quasi-identifier attributes {QID). In recent 
years, studies [43, 34，49, 51, 50, 30，14，32] have been made to ensure that 
the sensitive information of individuals cannot be easily identified in a static 
table by generalizing QIDs to form anonymized groups and only publishing 
those cloaked anonymized groups. 
1.2.1 Motivat ion 
Serial publishing for dynamic databases is often necessary when insertions, 
deletions and updates are made in the microdata. To our best knowledge, 
there are only three works targeting parts of these scenarios. The first one, 
proposed by Byun et, al. [6], uses delayed publishing to avoid problems caused 
by insertions, but does not consider deletions and updates. The second work 
13] also considers only insertions. The third one, m-invariance [52], considers 
both insertion and deletion and requires that each individual is linked to a 
fixed set of at least m distinct sensitive values. Counterfeit records sometimes 
are added into the published table in order to protect privacy in data with 
deletions. However, data updates have not been considered in m-invariance. 
Our work is motivated by four main challenges. 
Firstly, both the QID value and sensitive value of an individual can change, 
^There are many sources of such an external table. Most municipalities sell population reg-
isters that include the identifiers of individuals along with basic demographics; examples include 
local census data, voter lists, city directories, and information from motor vehicle agencies, tax 
assessors, and real estate agencies [40]. In the voter list, 87% of the voters were identifiable with 
just the full postal code, gender and birth date [41]. Prom [43], it is reported that a city's voter 
list in two diskettes was purchased for twenty dollars, and was used to re-identify medical records. 
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P I D A g e Zip . P I D A g e Zip . P I D A g e Zip. 
PI 23 16355 PI 23 16355 pi 23 16355 
P2 22 15500 p2 22 15500 P2 22 15500 
P3 21 12900 p3 21 12900 P3 21 12900 
P4 26 18310 p4 26 18310 P4 26 18310 
P5 25 25000 P5 25 25000 ps 25 15000 
P6 20 29000 p6 20 29000 pe 20 29000 
P7 24 33000 p7 24 33000 P7 24 33000 
p 丨叫 31 31000 P |kl | 31 31000 p 丨叫 31 31000 
(a)尺£i (b)7^£2 (c)7^£3 
P I D D i s e a s e P I D Di sease P I D D i s e a s e 
Pi Flu Pi Flu Pi Flu 
P2 HIV p2 HIV p2 HIV 
P3 Fever P3 Flu P3 Flu 
P4 HIV p4 HIV P4 HIV 
P5 Flu p5 Fever P5 Fever 
P6 Fever pe Fever pe Fever 
(d) Ti (e) T2 (f) Ts 
Table 1.1: Voter Registration List(RL) and Microdata(T) 
while some special sensitive values should remain unchanged. For example, 
after a move, the postal code of an individual changes. That is, the external 
table such as a voter registration list can have multiple releases and changes 
from time to time. Also, a patient may recover from one disease but develop 
another disease. The motivating example for [6] and [52] is that the adversary 
may notice a neighbor being sent to hospital, from which s/he knows that a 
record for the neighbor must exist in two or more consecutive releases. They 
further assume that the disease attribute of the neighbor must remain the 
same in these releases. However, the presence of the neighbor in multiple 
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P I D G . I D A g e Zip. D i s e a s e 
PI 1 [21’ 23] [12k, 17k] Flu 
P2 1 [21’ 23] [12k, 17k] HIV 
P3 1 [21, 23] [12k, 17k] Fever 
P4 2 [20’ 26] [18k’ 29k] HIV 
P5 2 [20, 26] [18k, 29k] Flu 
P6 2 [20’ 26] [18k’ 29k] Fever 
(a)First Publication Tf 
P I D G . I D A g e Zip . D i s e a s e 
P2 1 [20’ 22] [12k, 29k] HIV 
P3 1 [20, 22] [12k, 29k] Flu 
P6 1 [20, 2 2 ] 丨 12k’ 29k] Fever 
PI 2 [23’ 26] [16k, 25k] Flu 
P4 2 [23’ 26] [16k’ 25k] HIV 
P5 2 [23’ 26] [16k, 25k] Fever 
(b)Second Publication T^ 
P I D G . I D A g e Zip. D i s e a s e 
P2 1 [21, 25] [12k, 16k] HIV 
P3 1 [21’ 25] [12k, 16k] Flu 
P5 1 [21’ 25] [12k, 16k] Fever 
PI 2 [20’ 26] [16k, 29k] Flu 
P4 2 [20’ 26] [16k, 29k] HIV 
P6 2 [20’ 26] [16k, 29k] Fever 
(c)Third Publication T3* 
Table 1.2: Published Tables T* satisfying 3-invariance 
data releases does not imply that the records for the neighbor will remain 
the same in terms of the sensitive value. At the same time, some sensitive 
values that once linked to an individual can never be unlinked. For instance, 
in medical records, sensitive diseases such as HIV, diabetes and cancers are to 
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this date incurable, and therefore they are expected to persist. W e call these 
values permanent sensitive values. Permanent sensitive values can be found in 
many domains of interest. Some examples are "having a pilot's qualification" 
and "having a criminal record". 
W e take m-invariance as a representative to illustrate the inadequacy of 
traditional approaches for the scenarios above, by the following example. In 
Tables 1.1, TIC\、7ZC2 and TZC^ are snapshots of a voter registration list at 
times 1，2 and 3, respectively. The microdata table Ti, T2 and T3 are to 
be anonymized at times 1，2 and 3, respectively. In Table 1.2, three tables 
77, T2 and T3* are published serially at times 1, 2, and 3，respectively. It 
is easy to see that T^, TJ and TJ satisfy 3-invariance. This is because in 
any release, for each individual, the set of 3 distinct sensitive values that 
the individual is linked to in the corresponding anonymized group remains 
unchanged. Note that HIV is a permanent disease but Flu and Fever are 
transient diseases. Furthermore, assume that from the registration lists, one 
can determine that pi, p2, Pe are the only individuals who satisfy the 
QID conditions for the groups with G.ID = 1 and G.ID = 2 in all the three 
tables of T^, T2 and TJ. Then surprisingly, the adversary can determine that 
P4 has HIV with 100% probability. The reason is based on possible world 
exclusion from all published releases. First, we show that pi and Pq cannot 
be linked to HIV. Suppose that pi suffers from HIV. In Tf，since pi，p2 and ps 
form an anonymized group containing one HIV value, we deduce that both 
P2 and p3 are not linked to HIV. Similarly, in TJ, since pi,p4 and p5 form an 
anonymized group containing one HIV value, p4 and ps are non-HIV carriers. 
Similarly, from TJ, we deduce that p4 and pe are not linked to HIV. Then, we 
conclude that p2, P3, P4, P5 and pe do not contract HIV. However, in each of 
the releases T*, T; and TJ, we know that there are two HIV values. This leads 
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to a contradiction. Thus, pi cannot be linked to HIV. Similarly, by the same 
inductions, pe cannot be an HIV carrier. Finally, from the anonymized group 
with G.ID = 2 in Tg , we figure out that p^ must be an HIV carrier! No matter 
how large m is, this kind of possible world exclusion can appear after several 
publishing rounds. Note that even if the registration list remains unchanged, 
the same problem can occur since the six individuals can be grouped in the 
same way as in 1\*，T; and T^ at 3 different time, according to the algorithm 
in [52；. 
Secondly, the anonymization mechanism for serial publishing should pro-
vide individual-based protection. Yet previous works [6] and [52] focus on 
record-based protection. In m-invariance [52], each record is associated with 
a lifespan of contiguous releases and a signature which is an invariant set of 
sensitive values linking to r』in the published table. If a record Vj for individ-
ual Pi appears at time j, disappears at time j + 1 (e.g. pi may discontinue 
treatment or m a y switch to another hospital), and reappears at time j + 2， 
the appearance at j + 2 is treated as a new record rj+2 in the anonymization 
process of [52]. There is no memory of the previous signature for rj, and 
a new signature is created for rj+2. Let us take a look at T^ in Table 1.2. 
From T*, we can find that by 3-invariance, the signature of the records for pi 
and ps in Tf is {Flu, HIV, Fever}. If pi and ps recover from Flu and Fever 
at time 2 (not in T2), and reappears due to other disease at time 3(in T3), 
the reappearance of pi and ps in T3 is treated as new records r[, r'^ and by 
m-invariance, there is no constraint for their signature. Thus, at time 3，if 
the signatures for r[ and r'3 do not contain HIV, pi and ps will be excluded 
from HIV. Consequently, p2 will be found to have HIV! However, it is not 
easy to extend m-invariance to individual-based protection. For example, 
binding invariant signatures to individuals is not feasible, since an individual 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 12 
may develop new diseases that are not in the signature. 
Thirdly, the knowledge model for the adversary should be realistic. Liter-
ature [6] and [52] assume that it is trivial to obtain the background knowledge 
of each individual's presence or absence in every snapshot of the microdata. 
However, gaining this kind of participation knowledge can be as hard as know-
ing the individual's sensitive values, because one's participation in a micro-
data snapshot is also confidential. For example, [37] deals with protecting 
the information about the presence of individuals in a data release. A more 
plausible scenario is that an adversary knows the participation knowledge of 
a few close friends. 
Fourthly, suppression (removing a record that should exist) is better than 
counterfeit (a deleted record is not deleted). If a rare but deadly disease 
such as S A R S is suppressed in the published data, we can still broadcast the 
existence of such a disease without breaching privacy. O n the other hand, if a 
record of SARS is counterfeited but is known to be wiped out, the counterfeit 
will be discovered and lose its protection power for the previous releases. 
1.2.2 Contribution 
This paper presents a first study of the problem of privacy preserving serial 
data publishing with permanent sensitive values and dynamic registration 
lists. W e analyze the difficulty and show that without permanent sensitive 
values, traditional models such as f diversity [34] are enough to protect pri-
vacy for serial publishing. However, with permanent sensitive values, the 
problem becomes very difficult. No generalization is possible if we assume 
the adversary possesses full participation knowledge. Fortunately, such an 
assumption is not realistic and we can assume limited participation knowl-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 13 
P I D G . I D A g e Zip . Di sease 
( P ^ ( P ^ PI 1 丨22’ 25] [15k’ 17k] Flu 
v j y v j y v j y ^^ i 【22’ 25] [15k’ 17k] HIV 
1 [22, 25] [15k, 17kl Fever 
P3 2 [20’ 26] [12k, 29k] Flu 
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 P4 2 [20’ 26] [12k, 29k] HIV 
P6 2 [20’ 26] [12k’ 29k] Fever 
(a) Cohorts (b) T3*， 
Table 1.3: Generalization T3' by HD-composition 
edge instead. 
W e propose an anonymization method called HD-composition which in-
volves two major roles, namely holder and decoy. The objective is to bound 
the probability of linkage between any individual and any sensitive value by 
a given threshold, e.g., l/^ .^ Suppose an individual pi has a sensitive value s 
in the microdata. One major technique used for anonymizing static data is 
to form an anonymized group mixing pi and other individuals whose sensi-
tive values are not s. Merely having the published anonymized groups, the 
adversary cannot establish strong linkage from pi to s. W e also follow this 
basic principle, where we call the individual to be protected a holder and 
some other individuals for protection decoys. 
W e propose two major principles for partitioning: role-based partition and 
cohort-based partition. By role-based partition, in every anonymized group 
of the published data, for each holder of a permanent sensitive value s, £ - 1 
decoys which are not linked to s can be found. Thus, each holder is masked by 
£-1 decoys. By cohort-based partition, for each permanent sensitive value s, 
we construct £ cohorts, one for holders and the other i — 1 for decoys; restrict 
that decoys from the same cohort cannot be placed in the same partition, 
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this is to imitate the properties of true holders. 
Consider the example in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, where i = 3. Since p2 
and p4 are HIV-holders in J\. In Table 1.3(a), they are both in cohort 1 where 
all HIV-holders are stored. In T{’ pi and ps form an anonymized group with 
an HIV-holder (i.e. P2), and they are HIV-decoys. p： and ps are inserted 
into cohort 2 and 3，respectively. Similarly, pe and p5 are decoys for p^ in 
77, and are inserted into cohorts 2 and 3，respectively. With the constraints 
of cohort-based partition, we get anonymized table T3*'(Table 1.3(b)) rather 
than the problematic Table 1.2(c)). This is because in TJ, decoys pi and 
Pq are grouped with holder p4, but pi and pe are from cohort 2，which violates 
the constraint of cohort-based partition. 
It should be noted that our solution involves a novel idea of utilizing 
the assumption of a trusted data publisher and the benefit of making the 
anonymization process known to the public. It is obvious that the data pub-
lisher must be trusted. Otherwise, the published data cannot be used for data 
mining purpose. Hence, the publisher is assumed to follow the anonymiza-
tion algorithm exactly. Interestingly, the knowledge of the algorithm is then 
helpful to protect the privacy by ensuring a proper analysis of the probabil-
ity of linking individuals to sensitive values. More details will be given in 
Section 3.2.3. Therefore it turns out that providing more knowledge to the 
adversary actually helps in privacy protection, which is a surprising finding. 
Another interesting idea is to utilize the external information such as the 
voter registration lists to facilitate the anonymization. This is first suggested 
in [37]. The main observation is that there will typically be a lot of individu-
als who are in the registration list but are "absent" in a data release. These 
individuals can then help to anonymize the ones who are present. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the 
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related concepts and states the problem of serial data publishing. Section 3.2 
presents the solution HD-composition and the corresponding analytical study. 
Section 3.3 is an empirical study, demostrating the inadequacy of conventional 
privacy models and the cost of the proposed techniques. Section 2.7 surveys 
the previous work related to ours. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
Chapter 2 
Anomaly Monitoring 
W e propose our studies on the problem of monitoring anomalies over tra-
jectory streams in this chapter, which is organized as follows. Section 2.1 
states the problem. Section 2.2 introduces a preliminary method and Sec-
tion 2.3 introduces our pruning methods by local clustering. Section 2.4 is 
about the piecewise VP-tree based indexing technique. Section 2.5 extends 
our techniques to handle dynamic time warping distance. W e present exten-
sive experimental evaluations in Section 2.6. Related work is discussed in 
Section 2.7. 
2.1 Problem Statement 
Before we give the formal definition of the problem, we introduce several terms 
used in this thesis. Table 2.1 lists our main symbols and their meanings. 
For simplicity of illustration, trajectories used in the following definitions 
are 1-dimensional, yet all our definitions and techniques can be trivially ex-
tended for multi-dimensional trajectories. W e define a trajectory stream as 
a totally ordered infinite sequences S ={si, S2,..., St, ...}’ where Si is a real 
16 
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value arriving at a specific time tick i, and time tick i is after time tick i — 1. 
Without loss of generality, in our diagrams, the stream flow always comes 
from the right side. 
Given a trajectory stream S, any subsequence B ={si, Si+i, ..., Si+^Jb-i} 
of S, is called a base window, where wi is a pre-defined base window length. 
Given a base window 8 ={si, s^+i, ..., of a trajectory stream S ={si， 
St, ...}, and the subsequence L ={si-wi, Si-^i+i^ St-i} of length wi 
is defined as left sliding window, the subsequence R ={si+-ujt,, Si+^Jb+i^ 
...，Si+tur-i} of leng th Wr is def ined as B's right sliding window, whe re wi 
and Wr are pre-defined sliding window lengths. Figure 2.1 gives a visualized 
example about the basic constructs of trajectory stream, base window, left 
sliding window and right sliding window. 
The basic problem is to determine if a base window B has less than k 
neighbors in its left and right sliding windows, and if so, B is an anomaly. 
D e f i n i t i o n 1 ( D i s t a n c e ) D i s t a n c e ( q , c ) is a function that has base win-
dow q and c as inputs and returns a nonnegative value d, which is said to be 
the distance from q to c. 
W e firstly require that the function distance be a metric distance, and 
then extend it to dynamic time warping distance. Without loss of generality, 
we take Euclidean distance as the distance measure in our implementations. 
D e f i n i t i o n 2 ( N e i g h b o r ) Given a base window B ={sj，qj+i,...,qj+n-i} 
which is a candidate currently to be judged whether it is an anomaly，a tra-
jectory stream S ={si, S2,--. ,Sh} where h>n, and distance threshold d, for 
any subsequence Si ={s“ Sj+i,...； Si+n-i} ofS, if distance{B^ Si) < d, we say 
that Si is a neighbor of B in S. 
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Trajectory Stream Model 
Defini t ion 3 (Trajectory Stream Anomaly) For a base window B in S, 
we can get the number (n\) of B's neighbors in its left sliding window L, and 
the number (112) of B's neighbors in its right sliding window R, then B is a 
trajectory s tream anomaly ifrii + n2 < /c. 
The rationale behind Definition 3 is the observation that many anomalies 
.in a trajectory stream usually have salient spatial deviations from both pre-
ceding and succeeding normal subsequences, and last for a short period. In 
fact, other than the sliding window, the anomaly definition is the same as the 
distance-based outliers defined in [25]. In other words, we adopt traditional 
distance-based anomaly in stream scenario. However, the solution proposed 
for detecting distance-based anomaly in traditional static databases is not 
applicable to trajectory streams due to high-speed data update of stream 
data. 
W e end this section with an introdiictive definition of the anomaly moni-
toring problem. 
D e f i n i t i o n 4 ( P r o b l e m ) On trajectory stream S, at every time tick t, upon 
the arrival of St, we check whether the base window B ending at St—wr ^^ a 
trajectory stream anomaly. 
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Symbol Descriptions 
S The trajectory stream {si’ S2,…’ s � . . . } 
W The data window of S that is kept currently 
w The length of sliding window (when left and right are assumed equal) 
k The neighbor count threshold for trajectory stream anomalies 
d The distance threshold for trajectory stream anomalies 
m The size of local cluster 
Pa The real anomaly rate in a period on trajectory stream 
N{B) The number of neighbors for base window B 
T The distance threshold for local clusters 
r The average radius of local clusters (assume equal to r ) 
Vmax The maximum radius of local clusters in W 
Table 2.1: Descriptions of Notations 
Note that although our problem setting is to monitor anomalies over a 
stream from a single data source, we can simply extend the definition to 
handle multiple streams from not only homogenous but also heterogeneous 
data sources. For homogenous streams, for every new coming base window 
on one trajectory stream，we could accumulate the count of its neighbors 
on all other trajectory streams. For heterogeneous streams, we can merge 
streams from different sources into one multi-dimensional stream. Then，to 
extend our problem definition for a m - D trajectory stream, we only need 
to extend the distance measure: for base window X and Y, distance(X, 
2.2 A Preliminary Solution: Simple Pruning 
Obviously, directly computing the anomalies tick by tick is computationally 
expensive. For each base window B in the trajectory stream, we need rii 
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and 712，the numbers of neighbors in the left and right sliding windows of B, 
respectively. If ni + n2 < A: then B is an anomaly. One can adopt a more 
efficient method by random sampling suggested by [3] for outlier detection in 
traditional databases. To gather the counts of neighbors one can repeatedly 
pick some base window B in the left or right sliding window of in a random 
manner, and check whether B' is IS's neighbor. If B's neighbor count reaches 
k, 3 is certified to be non-anomaly and remaining search for B can be sim-
ply pruned. W e call this random sampling method simple pruning. Simple 
pruning can be seen as a set of independent Bernoulli trials where we keep 
drawing samples until k successes or the samples are exhausted. The follow-
ing theorem in literature [3] gives an analytic result of time cost by simple 
pruning. 
Theorem 1 (Cost of Simple Pruning) Let Fx{d) be the probability that a ran-
domly drawn example lies within distance d of base window x, Pa be the anomaly 
rate, N = wi Wr, let Y be a random variable representing the number of tri-
als (distance computations) until we have k successes, and let P{Y 二 y) be the 
probability of obtaining the k-th success on trial y. Then the expectation of Y is 
upper hounded by: 
聰 — + (2.1) 
Since Pa is tiny, E{Y) is dominated by which is independent of the sliding 
window sizes. Yet in most trajectory stream applications, the interval between two 
time ticks is quite short, therefore it still poses great challenges for us to design 
exact and efficient algorithms beyond simple pruning. In the rest of the thesis, 
we assume that the left and right sliding windows are of equal lengths w. Our 
discussions can easily be extended to unequal sliding window lengths. 
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2.3 Efficient Monitoring by Local Clusters 
Our goal is to do better than the simple priming technique. Our idea is based on 
the observation that most trajectory streams are locally continuous, so that two 
highly overlapping base windows tend to have a short distance. Figure 2.2 shows 
some normalized longitude series from a GPS trajectory. Figure 2.2(a) shows a 
salient distance between two non-overlapping base windows. Figure 2.2(b) shows 
the upcoming shapes of a window when it shifts by some time ticks; the original 
subsequence is shifted 2, 4，10, 20 time ticks to generate the 4 new subsequences. 
W e can observe that the original subsequence together with the 4 new generated 
ones are close to each other in terms of distance. 
Therefore, for trajectory streams of "local continuity", a large amount of dis-
tance computations can be saved by reusing the distances between some repre-
sentative subsequences. For example, in Figure 2.2(b), if a query subsequence q 
is far from the original subsequence, it must also be far away from the other 4 
subsequences. Based on the observation, we propose a local clustering-based ap-
proach to monitor anomalies, which utilizes the property of local continuity. In fact, 
many current time series/trajectory indexing methods have assumed the underline 
time series data have the local continuity property. Otherwise, neither D F T [1], 
D W T [8), A P C A [22] for Euclidean distance, nor LB_Keogh [21], LB_Zhu [57j for 
D T W distance could get a satisfactory pruning power on a highly fluctuant time 
series or trajectories. 
In Section 2.3.1, we introduce an online local clustering algorithm. Then, batch 
monitoring is established with pruning strategies in Section 2.3.2. Finally we give 
a detailed cost analysis in Section 2.3.3. 
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Figure 2.2: Local Continuity Feature 
2.3.1 Incremental Local Clustering 
In the following we define local cluster C as a trajectory subsequence of size at 
most rub in which there exists a base window B, so that all other base windows 
in C are within a certain distance r from B. One such base window B is chosen 
as the pivot of C. W e shall show that local clusters are easy to build and can be 
incrementally updated, which fits the requirement of continuous trajectory streams 
perfectly. How to determine mb and r will be discussed later. 
Definit ion 5 (Local Cluster) With a distance threshold T and a temporal con-
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straint rrib, given a sequence C = {s^, s^+i,..., sj], j — i 1 < rrib, which is a piece 
of a trajectory stream S, if 3sk G C, \fsx 6 C, Bx and Bk being base windows ending 
at Sx and Sk respectively, distance{13k^Bx) < t, C is called a local cluster. 
The concepts of pivot, radius, left bin and right bin are used in our algorithm 
to form local clusters. The parameter mj, specifies how many based windows in a 
local cluster, while r specifies the max distance from the center base window (pivot) 
to other base window in the local cluster. Both parameters need to be specified for 
local clustering. 
Definition 6 (Pivot, Radius, Left Bin and Right Bin) For a local cluster C 
of distance threshold T, a special point Sx E C is selected as C，s pivot , where Sx 
satisfies the condition that VSF G C, Bx and Bi being base windows ending at Sx and 
Si respectively, distance (Bx, Bi)< r. The value of maximums 仗 distance(sa:,s) is 
called C 's radius. Points whose time ticks are less (greater) than x in C constitute 
pivot Sx 's left bin (right binj. 
For each local cluster structure, 4 variables are stored: its pivot's position on 
the sliding window, the start and end positions that it covers, and its radius. In 
the following part, we also use pivot to denote either the base window ending at 
its position or the corresponding local cluster structure. In Figure 2.3，a greedy-
approach is used to form local cluster partitions. With this algorithm, for each 
resulting cluster, each time tick U in the left bin requires at most k distance com-
putations if there are k elements in the current left bin. For time ticks in the 
right bin, each requires a single distance computation. Thus if the average cluster 
size is m then the average number of distance computations per time tick is upper 
bounded by m/2. 
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Algorithm Online Local Clustering 
Input: latest base window Bnew, latest time tick t 
Global variables: distance threshold r, temporal constraint rub, boolean pivot found, cur-
rent pivot Pcurrent, Current radius r, current left bin C. (Initially pivot found FALSE; 
^current^NULL, r<—0； L <— •,、 
1: if pivot found = FALSE t h e n 
2： if the distance disti between Bnew and any base window Bi ending in the current 
left bin > r or current cluster size = m^ t h e n 
3: the current left bin minus time tick t — 1 is the final left bin 
4: set t ime tick t _ 1 as the pivot Pcurrent 
5： pivotfound — T R U E 
6： e l s e 
7： t ime tick t is added to the current left bin L 
8: update r to be the greatest disti 
9: if pivotfound t h e n 
10： find distance dist between Bnew and the base window ending at Pcurrent 
11: if dist > T or current cluster size is mi, t h e n 
12: time ticks in {pcurrent, •••, t - 1} U £ forms a local cluster 
13： set current left bin £ to {t}, r <— 0, 
14： Pcurrent 一 NULL, pivotfound <— FALSE 
15: e l s e 
16： if dist > r t h e n 
17: r dist 
Figure 2.3: Online Local Clustering 
2.3.2 Batch Monitoring by Cluster Join 
With local clusters, we could search for neighbors in a batch manner. Neighbor 
search is triggered after the latest local cluster is constructed or before the oldest 
local cluster is to be removed (on expiry). In order to achieve that we must keep 
all needed data points, which we call the current sliding window W. Let toi be the 
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(e) Case 5 
Figure 2.4: Local Cluster Relationships 
oldest time tick in the local clusters that overlap with the left sliding windows of 
the new data points that have not been clustered, and to2 be the oldest time tick 
of a local cluster whose entire right sliding window has not yet arrived. W is made 
up of all time ticks from mm{toi,io2} to the current time tick. 
There are two concurrent steps in the batch monitoring: 
• When a new local cluster Cnew is constructed, we join it with the preceding 
clusters in a random order (by a dusterjoin function) in W until every base 
window in Cnew has more than k neighbors. If we exhaust all possible candidate 
base windows in the left sliding window and cannot find k neighbors for base 
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window B in Cnew we keep the neighbor counts for B. 
• When the right sliding windows of all base windows in the oldest local cluster CqM 
have arrived, the neighbor counts of these base windows in their corresponding 
right sliding windows are determined in a similar way. The neighbor count ni 
collected in step (1) for a base window B is to be added to the count n) in this 
step to give the total count of N{B). 
In the two batch monitoring steps, the cluster join function is to find the neigh-
bors in some cluster C for each base window in Cnew^ which is a critical and ex-
pensive operation. Note that if the average cluster size is m , the brute force join 
cost is O(m^). However, based on properties of the local clusters, we could utilize 
several rules to enhance efficiency as follows. Note that naturally we consider base 
windows as points and local clusters as hyper balls in high dimensional space in 
the proofs. 
L e m m a 1 Given two local clusters C\ and C2, if distance{Ci.pivot,C2-pivot) + 
Ci .radius + C2-radius < d, then V base window pair Bi and Bj, Bi E Ci and Bj G 
C2, distance{Bi, Bj) < d. 
Proof: Connect Ci .pivot and C2 .pivot, and extend the line segment bidirection-
ally, to intersect the two circles (clusters) at I\ and I2. Therefore, I/1/2I < d. Let I 
be the middle point of /i and I2. Draw a circle C that its center is I and its diam-
eter is I/1/2I. Then both Bi and Bj are in C. Thus, distance{Bi,Bj) < Ihh] < d. 
• 
L e m m a 2 Given two local clusters Ci and C2, if distance{Ci.pivot,C2.pivot)— 
Ci.radius — Cz.radius > d, then V base window pair Bi and Bj, Bi G C： and Bj G 
C2, distance(J3i, Bj) > d. 
Proof: Connect Ci.pivot and C2.pivot, the line segment intersects two cir-
cles (clusters) at /i and I2. Then distance{Bi, Bj) > Ihhl > d. • 
CHAPTER 2. ANOMALY MONITORING 27 
L e m m a 3 Given a base window B and a local cluster C, if distance(J3,C.pivot) + 
C.radius < d, then V base window Bi G C, distance{B, Bi) < d. 
Proof: Connect B and C.pivot, extend the line segment from C.pivot, and 
intersect C at I. Connect 6 and Bi, Bi and I. The angle BBil is larger than 90 
degree. Thus, distance{l3,Bi) < \BI\ < d. • 
L e m m a 4 Given two base windows Bi G C： and Bj G C2, consider base win-
dows as points and local clusters as hyper-balls in high-dimensional space with 
their pivots as centroids, the perpendicular bisector hyper-plane V of Ci and C2, 
if distance{C\.pivot,C2.pivot) — Ci.radius — C2-radius < d and distance(J3i,V) + 
distance{Bj,V) > d, then distance{Bi,Bj) > d. 
Proof: Connect Ci .pivot and C2-pivot. By the property of right-angled triangle, 
distance(J3i, Bj) > distance{Si,V) + distance{Bj,V) > d. • 
The 4 lemmas allow us to devise pruning strategies that guarantee the correct-
ness in anomaly monitoring. Totally, there are 5 cases for the spatial relationship 
between two local clusters, as depicted in Figure 2.4(a) to Figure 2.4(e). In Case 1 
all elements in cluster C are neighbors of all elements in the query cluster Q, and in 
this case, joining the two clusters requires only one distance computation (between 
their pivots). In Case 2 no element in cluster C is the neighbor of any element in 
query cluster Q, and in this case, to join the two clusters requires only one distance 
computation, too. 
In Case 3 where all elements in cluster C are neighbors of some elements in 
query cluster Q, and for those elements in Q, only one distance computation is 
needed. In Case 4 some elements in cluster C are neighbors of all elements in query-
cluster Q, and for those elements in C, only one distance computation is needed. In 
Case 5 some elements in cluster C are neighbors of some elements in query cluster 
Q, in this undesirable case, still some distance computations could be pruned by 
Lemma 4，which is illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: Lemma 4 
With the above analysis, we can join clusters by checking which case the rela-
tionship belongs to, and then prune the distance computations. Note that situa-
tions of Cases 3, 4 and 5 are overlapping, so that some situation may belong to all 
the 3 cases. Therefore, we apply pruning in the order of Case 3，Case 4, then Case 
5. 
By our proposed local clustering scheme, we can guarantee the correctness of 
retrieved result set (no false dismissal). By other clustering algorithms such k-
means an so on, it will be difficult to guarantee this point. Besides, local clustering 
requires not only the distances of base windows are close, but also the base windows 
in it are continuous. No existing solution considers this point. Good clustering 
is not our objective, but good pruning power in processing continuous anomaly 
monitoring is. 
2.3.3 Cost Analysis and Optimization 
Now we analyze the cost of local clustering based batch monitoring, where both 
the benefit and overhead of local clustering are well considered. 
In our analysis, it is assumed that the. sliding window is of sufficient length (this 
models a very large databases which has a large amount of historical trajectory 
stream), so we could increase the neighbor counts only when Case 1 in Figure 2.4 
is encountered, and ignore the other 4 cases. Although this may not be optimal, it 
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is enough to theoretically show our superiority over simple pruning. 
Let m be the average cluster size. W e can think of the process of joining a 
query cluster with candidate local clusters as independent Bernoulli trials where 
we keep drawing candidates until「/c/m"] successes appears or all candidates are 
exhausted. Hence, the number of trials follows the Pascal distribution. Assuming 
the average radius of clusters is r, we have the following analytic results: Theorem 
2 gives the time cost per time tick, while Corollary 2 proposes the optimized setting 
for cluster size. 
Theorem 2 (Time Cost by Batch Monitoring) Let Fxid) be the probability 
that a randomly drawn example pivot lies within distance d of query cluster's pivot 
X, and Pa is the rate of anomalies in the data set at time t. Data value St at time 
tick t is within the left bin or right bin of x, and N= Wi + Wr- Then the expected 
number of distance computations Y at the time tick t is upper bounded by: 
聊 + 户 a i V + f (2.2) 
Proof: The total expected cost of batch monitoring consists of 3 parts: the 
cost expectation on neighbor search for normal cases, the expected cost on search 
for clusters with anomalies, and the cost of building local clusters. W e first an-
alyze the expected distance computations Z during cluster joins for normal (non-
anomaly) query clusters, which will definitely stop at some trail (distance compu-
tation). Then, the following formula could be derived: 
E{Z) = i f^ P{Z = z)z 
m 
/V 




< - E ( C T ' F ^ i d - 2 r ) m ( 1 - - 2 r ) r — ) z 
Tn , m 
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Due to pruning by case 2，the cost for clusters with anomalies is 
^{Canomaly) ^ PaN 
The cost of local clustering incurring on every data point should be included, 
which is: 
举 ) ^ f -
E(r) = E(Z+aanomaiy+C)=E(Z)+E(Canomaiy)+E(C), thus Inequality 2.2 holds. 
• 
C o r o l l a r y 1 ( O p t i m a l C l u s t e r Size) Ignoring the cost for anomaly cases 
(which is a small constant for any algorithm), the cost of batch monitoring on 
every time tick could be optimized when: 
(2.3) 
then, the upper bound of minimized cost min{E{Y)) could be obtained: 
- 侧 ) … / i i S (2.4) 
Proof: The cost in right side of Inequality 2 could be minimized when its 
partial derivative on m is 0, thus, we let: 
m y ) — 1 — 0 
dm 2 m^F:c{d-2r) 
Therefore, we could get: 
3厂 4 f c 
Applying Equation 2.3 to Inequality 2.2，Inequality 2.4 holds. • 
With Corollary 1’ we periodically reset m = and T=F-^{mbF{r)), 
where ^(distance distribution) and r are aggregated from the past stream. At 
initialization, we set mb=6wb and T=d/8. 
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Once the cluster is formed, it will never be changed; therefore there is no 
computational maintenance cost, but only some memory cost to store the local 
cluster data structure, the cost of which is given as follows. 
Property 1 (Memory Cost by Batch Monitoring) Due to the extra mem-
ory for storing local cluster structures, the additional memory cost is 
, which is very small, compared to the basic necessary memory \W\. 
Remark 1 (Batch Monitoring V.s. Simple Pruning) For trajectory 
streams with local continuity, attested by our experiments, r usually is tiny com-
pared to d. Hence, Fx{d — 2r) « Fx{d). Thus the search cost of batch processing 
is nearly the cost of simple pruning divided by w?, where m is the average size 
of local clusters. With optimized parameters, the cost could be reduced to nearly 
^cost of simple pruning. 
2.4 Piecewise Index and Query Reschedule 
Through local cluster-based pruning, the distance computations will be largely 
reduced. However, most distance computations are spent on the normal cases 
since most base windows extracted from the trajectory streams are not anomalies. 
Hence, looking at the batch monitoring, if the candidate clusters are joined in 
a perfect order so that the query cluster first join with candidate clusters that 
satisfy the condition of case 1 in Figure 2.4(a), the query could be proven to 
contain no anomalies quickly by very few distance computations (only one distance 
computation for each candidate cluster C, while the number of neighbors increases 
、 b y |C| ). 
If we examine Figure 2.4 again, case 3 or case 4 is more likely to give rise to 
more neighbors for the query cluster with less distance computations than case 5. 
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Hence we use 
ri.i … increase in number of neighbors to Q 
utility of C = — ： 
number of distance computations 
to measure the goodness of a candidate cluster. Obviously the greater the utility 
is, the better the candidate is; and vice versa. Comparing cases 3, 4, and 5 in the 
above, the distance between the pivot of a candidate cluster and pivot of a query-
cluster can indicate the utility, smaller distance corresponds to higher utility. 
Therefore, our basic idea is to build index structures for searching for nearby 
candidate clusters' pivots and then reschedule the cluster join order so as to ap-
proach the best search order so as to approach the best search order. W e propose a 
novel way to index pivots along a trajectory stream by piecewise VP-trees (Vantage 
Point Tree [11]). The choice of VP-trees is because they occupy less memory (since 
only pivots need to be maintained in a tree node) compared to i?-tree's bound-
ing boxes. Actually, any tree index structures that do not store high dimensional 
vectors in their internal nodes could be employed here. 
W e build piecewise VP-trees, in particular a different VP-tree is built for each 
fixed size piece or interval of the data stream. The piecewise indexing allows us to 
remove an entire VP-tree on data expiry, which is much more efficient compared 
to the use of a single index tree where the expired data need to be deleted one by 
one. 
2.4.1 P iecewise VP-trees 
Figure 2.6 displays a overview of the structure of piecewise VP-trees over a trajec-
tory stream: each VP-tree is to index pivots of a continuous period, while pivots 
the whole sliding window are indexed by v VP-trees, from VP-tree 1 to Vp-tree v, 
except some boundary ones near the start or end of the sliding window. The basic 
unit of piecewise VP-trees is shown in Figure 2.7, where VP-tree i indexes an array 
of pivots (black circles) in the box, which correspond to the local clusters spanning 
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Figure 2.6: Piecewise VP-trees along the Sliding Window 
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Figure 2.7: A VP-tree Unit on the Sliding Window-
over a piece of a trajectory stream from time ticks 21,000 to 32,000. Now we 
introduce how the piecewise index structure works and consider the insert, delete, 
and query operations on the piecewise index. 
Tree Insertion. When a new data point appends to the trajectory stream, the 
local clustering procedure is triggered. When a new local cluster with its pivot 
Pnew is formed, it is immediately put into a list I/„eu;(as shown in Figure 2.6) for 
new coming pivots. The list Lnew is continuously updated until its size reaches the 
predefined number (TV) of pivots indexed by one VP-tree, at which point a new 
VP-tree is built from the pivots in Lnew and inserted into the VP-tree list Lvp, 
and Lnew is reset to empty. Note that once a VP-tree is built, the only function of 
it is to answer range queries targeting at the pivots which are indexed by it, and 
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Algorithm VP-tree Based Reschedule 
Input: latest local cluster Cnew 
Global variable: sliding window W, maximum local cluster radii rmax 
1： for every VP-tree T in W do 
2: List candidates — query (Cnew, T, rmax + + d) 
3： insert every candidate into minimum heap H, ordered by distance to Cnew 
4: w h i l e not Cneu；-stopO do 
5： clusterJoin(C„eiy, H.TopQ)] 
6: if Cneiu • s top0 t h e n 
7： break; 
8： Cold 一 oldest local cluster in W 
9： for every VP-tree T in do 
10: L i s t candidates 卜 query(Cow, T , Vmax + rcoia + 
11： insert every candidate into minimum heap H, ordered by distance to Coid 
12: w h i l e not Coid-stop{) do 
13： clusterJoin(Co/d, H.Top{))\ 
14： if Coid-StopO t h e n 
15： break; 
16: consider boundary subsequences for Cnew and Cold if necessary 
Figure 2.8: VP-tree Based Reschedule 
will never be updated all its life time. 
Tree Deletion. When some data point in the scope of a VP-tree phases out, 
the VP-tree is removed from Lvp, all its pivots will be inserted into a list Lo/d(as 
shown in Figure 2.6). Once a data point St phases out, the "start position" of its 
pivot Poid (also current oldest pivot) will be changed to i + 1. When Pow's end 
position equals to its start position, Poia will be removed from Lcm. 
Query Processing. When a new local cluster Cnew is formed, we can find the 
neighbor counts in the left sliding windows by querying the VP-trees. Also when 
all the right sliding windows of the oldest local cluster Coid have arrived, we can 
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count the total neighbors of base windows in Coid to uncover anomalies. In either 
case, Cnew or Coid becomes a query cluster Q. Given a query cluster Q with radius 
vq, let Vmax be the maximum radius of the current set of local clusters, for anomaly 
detection, a special case of range query with {d + Vmax + ^Q) (see Table 1 for d) as 
the range is issued. When the number of neighbors of every base windows in the 
query cluster reaches k (see Table 1 for k), the query processing is stopped. This 
is called the stopping condition for Q (Vg € Q, N{q) >= k) (see iV() in Table 1). 
2.4.2 Candidate Rescheduling 
When a batch search(range query) is issued, we first look for the query cluster's 
nearby clusters in the VP-tree list. However, the trick here is that we do not 
join the query cluster with selected candidate clusters immediately when they are 
found, for the reason that in worst case, the join cost for two local cluster pair of 
size m will require m? distance computations. Instead, we first enter candidate 
local clusters' pivots into a candidate list, which is to be used by the pending query 
planning steps. 
When a new local cluster Cnew is constructed (or the oldest cluster Cnew is 
expiring), we search its nearby local clusters in the VP-trees one by one until the 
stopping condition is reached or all trees are searched. Once the candidate local 
cluster list is obtained after executing the query on one VP-tree, candidate clusters 
in the list are put into a minimum heap, where the ranking of clusters is based 
on the distances between candidate local clusters' pivots and the query cluster's 
pivot. The smaller is the distance, the higher layer the candidate is placed in the 
minimum heap. The original batch monitoring procedure is now modified to follow 
the rescheduled join order, the detailed algorithm are in Figure 2.8. 
Figure 2.9 demonstrates an example about how the rescheduling works on one 
VP-tree. For the query Q, we first get 4 candidate pivots through a search in 
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Join(Q, H.TopO) 
Z Z Minimum Heap H 、 、 
— — — — : - - — 
••n HIT n 1. ” F^ 
• • • ... . . • : 
VP-tree i | I Query Q 
Figure 2.9: Join Reschedule 
VP-tree i, then the 4 candidates are put into the minimum heap H, the ranking 
of which is based on distance between candidates' pivots and Q's pivot. Finally, Q 
keeps joining with the top element of H until the stopping condition is met or all 
candidates are searched. 
2.4.3 Cost Analysis 
The above strategy improves efficiency from both VP-trees' pruning power and 
query rescheduling. Even without rescheduling, assuming the average pruning 
power of the VP-trees is p(0 < p < 1), the search cost could be reduced to 
(1 - p) • E{Y) (see E(Y) in Theorem 2). With rescheduling, the data process-
ing speed will be even faster. Property 2 and 3 analyze the extra cost during index 
construction and extra requirements for memory. 
Property 2 (Index Building Cost of Piecewise VP-trees) Given that riyp 
is the number of pivots indexed by one VP-tree, ni is the number of pivots indexed 
in one leaf node, m is average cluster size, the number of distance computations 
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during tree construction incurred for every time tick is: 
Costbuiid = 一 2 「 ⑶ = l l o g 2 「 ’ 1 (2.5) 
nm m ni 
Obviously, in most cases, compared to the cost E{Y)(in Theorem 2), CostbuUd is 
small. 
Property 3 (Memory Cost of Piecewise VP-trees) Given m and ni as in 
Property 2 ,\W\(the left or right sliding window length), we derive the extra memory 
cost for VP-trees: 
= + (2.6) 
mni mni mni 
Costvp ~ \CostBM (CosIbm is in Property 1), since normally ni is much larger 
than 4. 
W e use a simple strategy to set a suitable tree size by dynamically and period-
ically probing according to performance. 
2.5 Upper Bound Lemma: For Dynamic Time Warp-
ing Distance 
In this part, we discuss how to reuse the anomaly monitoring framework when 
the distance measure changes to dynamic time warping(DTW) distance [21], since 
D T W distance is an usual measure for similarity between time series. For anomaly 
monitoring, p-square rooted D T W distance could be used as an alternative to Lp 
distance. The difficulty is that p-square rooted D T W distance is not metric, and 
then the solution of local clustering and VP-tree based reschedule could not be 
applied. Even worse, to compute D T W distance requires dynamic programming, 
which is very time consuming. Fortunately, we find that the p-square rooted D T W 
distance is upper bounded by the corresponding Lp distance, as the following lemma 
states. 
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L e m m a 5 Let q and c be two real sequences of length n. Let DTW(qn,Cn)= 
DTW(n-l, n-1), where 
distance{qi, Cj) + min{DTW{i — 1, 
j - l),DTW{i — l,j),DTW{i,j - 1)} 
DTW{iJ) = 
distance{qo,co) (i = 0,j = 0) 
n - 1 




1.Induction base: DTW(gi, ci) = distance(卯，CQ); 
2.Induction hypothesis: 
k-l 
DTW{qk, Ck) = DTW{k - 1,/c - 1) < ^ distance{qi, c^ ); 
i=0 
3. Then, 
DTW{qk+i,Ck+i) = DTWik,k) 
=distance{qk, Ck) + min{DTW{k — 1’ 
/ e - 1), DTW{k, k-l), DTW{k 一 1， 
k)] 
k-l 
< distance{qk, Ck) + ^ distance{qi,ci) 
i=Q 
k 
< ^ distance(qi, Ci) 
1=0 
Therefore, the lemma holds. • 
With L e m m a 5，if distance{qi,ci)={qi - c^ 广’ then ^DTW{qn,Cn) < 
pj Y j {Qi - CiY- Thus, with the upper bound, our data structures and algorithms 
V i=o 
for Lp distance can serve as an efficient anomaly filter for p-square rooted D T W 
distance. The following lemma explains the reason. 
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L e m m a 6 With the same parameter Wb，wi, Wr, k, and d, on a trajectory stream 
S, assume Ad is the set of anomalies detected by a Lp distance D, and A^tw 
is the set of anomalies detected by p-square rooted DTW distance(D is the base 
distance). Then A q t w Q ^d-
Proof: Nw G A DTW, w must have k' neighbors(by ^DTW) where k' < k. By-
Lemma 5, w must have no more than k' neighbors by D, therefore w e Ad. • 
In this way, anomalies under corresponding base Lp distance are firstly reported, 
and then they are tested whether anomalies under p-square rooted D T W distance. 
Since p-square rooted D T W is non-metric distance, the local clustering and VP-
tree based method could not be used. Instead, we have to use the simple pruning 
method for it. Whereas anomalies by Lp are rare, the chance of anomaly verification 
for p-square rooted D T W is tiny. 
It would be very interesting to consider different base window length, yet cur-
rently this work only considers a fixed window length. Even under the fixed sub-
sequence length, D T W is still useful. 
2.6 Experimental Evaluations 
In this section, we evaluate both the effectiveness and efficiency of our anomaly 
monitoring algorithm by extensive experimental studies. Both real world 
datasets (movement, spaceshuttle, ge, altitude, latitude, longitude) and synthetic 
dataset(random-walk)^ are used. A Pentium IV 2.2GHz P C with 2GB R A M is used 
to conduct all our experiments. In our implementation, we simulate the streaming 
manner by using a sliding window in the main memory. First we load a trajectory 
dataset into the main memory, and initialize the sliding window's start and end 
position. Then we keep sliding the sliding window until it touches the end of the 
dataset. When the sliding window slides one point forward, the anomaly detection 
1 All t h e d a t a s e t s a n d d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e ava i lab le a t : h t t p : / / w w w . c s e . c u h k . e d u . h k / � y y b u / r e p o s i t o r y / 
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Figure 2.10: Visualized Trajectory Anomaly 
procedure is triggered, and when the procedure is completed, the sliding window 
move one point forward again. For temporally overlapping anomalies, we only 
report the first discovered one which can represent the whole problematic region. 
2.6.1 Effect iveness 
W e test the usefulness of trajectory stream anomaly(as Definition 3) on 2 anno-
tated datasets "movement", "spaceshuttle". Figure 1.2(a) shows an anomaly in 
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Our Definition Our Definition 
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Figure 2.11: Effectiveness Comparisons With Burst and Discords ("movement") 
"spaceshuttle" which contains a series of spaceshuttle marotta values. "Move-
ment" (MO) contains 12 days' 3D trajectories(35170 data points and 3 dimensions 
for each point) of one person on his way between home and office, and is anno-
CHAPTER 2. ANOMALY MONITORING 48 
0.00020-
0.00018- • 
忍 0.00016- • • 
^ 0.00014- • • • 
a 0.00012： • • • 
.O 0.00010- • • • 
Id 0.00008」 • • • 
0.00006- • • • 
. g 0.00004； • I I 
> _ � 2 : • • • • • • 
0.00000 4 — i P — , — . 罕 , 
AL LA LO RW MO GE 
Datasets 
Figure 2.16: Pruning Power for p-square rooted D T W Distance 
VR gets orders of magnitude improvement (on average 310.6 times speedup) to SP 
and beats DWT significantly (on average 35.8 times speedup). Thus, even if DWT 
could only use the 1st coefficient to achieve the same pruning power, VR is still 
much more efficient. Prom Figure 2.15(a) and (b), we find that VR consumes little 
additional memory while DWT requires much more memory to store coefficients 
for each candidate subsequence. W e also compare the 4 algorithms under other 
parameter settings, and get similar results. Since all the 4 algorithms guarantee 
the correctness and get the same results according to the definition of trajectory 
stream anomaly, the efficiency improvement by our techniques neither have any 
quality sacrifice nor consume much additional memory. 
Besides, we also test the pruning power for p-square rooted D T W distance 
under the same parameter configurations. Figure 2.16 demonstrates that the upper 
bound lemma for p-square rooted D T W distance is very useful, because the rate 
of verifying anomalies by p-square rooted D T W is extremely low. The verification 
rate is the number of reported anomalies by Euclidean distance divided by the 
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number of all base windows, that is, the portion of base windows that need to be 
checked by p-square rooted D T W distance. 
2.7 Related Work 
Since trajectory is a special kind of time series that is locally continuous, we re-
view some works in time series databases. In the literature of time series researches, 
many worthy problems have been successfully tackled. Agrawal et al.'s pioneer-
ing work [1] uses D F T (discrete fourier transform) to reduce the dimensionality of 
time series. Faloutsos et al. [12] propose the GEMINI framework to support subse-
quence matching and dimension reduction techniques based on the lower bounding 
lemma in a filter and refine manner. Subsequent work includes various methods of 
dimension reduction for time series, such as S V D [27], D W T [8]，APCA [22], and 
Chebyshev Polynomials [7], all of which guarantee no false dismissals. Meanwhile, 
many novel and effective distance measures for (dis-)similarity between time series 
are proposed along with corresponding lower bounds, such as D T W (dynamic time 
warping) [53，21], LOSS (longest common subsequence) [45], ERP(edit distance 
with real penalty) [9], E D R (edit distance on real sequence) [10] and probabilistic 
measure [54]. However, these techniques are designed for similarity search. For 
anomaly detections in archive time series, Keogh et al. [24] use S A X (symbol ap-
proximate aggregation) and heuristic reorder on candidates to find discords, the 
discords have the furthest distances to their nearest neighbors. A Trie structure 
is used to reduce the search time. But their approach is not designed for data 
streams. In this new problem setting, the trie technique is no longer applicable due 
to the changing feature of data and the high update cost. 
With emerging requirements on continuous stream time series management, 
Zhu and Shasha [56] find statistics over a single stream and correlations among mul-
tiple data streams, where incremental D F T is used to prune uncorrelated stream 
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pairs. Vlachos et al. [46] identify bursts based on the computation of the moving 
average (MA) and propose a novel burst similarity measure by M A and intersec-
tions. Gao and Wang [15] reduce I/O cost for continuous similarity queries by 
pre-loading the predicted index pages and archived time series into the allocated 
cache memory. Bulut et al. [5] provide a well designed multi-resolution hierarchical 
index for monitoring aggregate and similarity query over a stream time series. How-
ever, none of the above works address the problem of monitoring general anomalies 
along a stream time series or trajectory streams where no fixed pattern exists. 
On the other hand, a lot of research results have been reported for usefulness and 
efficiency of mining distance-based anomaly (outlier) in traditional databases [17]. 
The common solution for distance-based anomaly detection applies a nested loop 
to search the range neighbors for every anomaly candidate. Knorr and Ng [25] 
develop a CELL-based method which can efficiently locate anomalies in very large 
datasets, yet it is known that the CELL-based method is not scalable to high-
dimensional datasets like time series. A nested-loop and index-based algorithm is 
employed in [39] to rank top n anomalies by distances(D、-)) to their k-th. nearest 
neighbors, a i?*-tree is used for the fc-nearest neighbors search of every point p 
and a partition-based algorithm is proposed. However, the i?*-tree method cannot 
be adapted to trajectory streams because it will suffer from continuous high speed 
update and huge memory cost. Bay et al. [3] search anomalies by a nested loop 
range neighbor search with a random order, together with a simple pruning step 
with a cutoff value, yet it is still quite slow for trajectory streams since too many 
subsequences need to be checked. Tao et al. [44] prove an upper bound for the 
memory consumption which permits the discovery of all anomalies by scanning 
the dataset 3 times, but it is not applicable to streams where available data keep 
changing. Breunig et al. [4] propose the concept of "local outliers", according to 
which an object is an outlier if it is significantly different from its spatially nearby 
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objects, while Jin et al. [20] build efficient pruning strategies to find "top-k local 
outliers". However, the anomalies we monitor are those trajectory subsequences 
significantly different from their temporally nearby ones, which fits the feature of 
stream data. 
Some other works are also related to ours. Hu et al. [18] propose a well-designed 
proactive caching method for spatial queries in mobile environments, yet their focus 
is on mobile objects rather than trajectory sequences. Mei et al. [36] present a 
probabilistic approach to mine spatiotemporal theme patterns from web logs, but 
we are mining abnormal spatiotemporal patterns in this work. 
Traditional anomaly definitions require the access to a global and static 
database, which could not exist in stream scenarios. In stream scenario, data 
keeps updating, but the limited memory can only store a limited "recent" sliding 
window only. Of course the solutions for static database anomalies could be applied 
here, but from the experimental results, we could find that our solution considering 
the specific features of trajectory streams has got orders of magnitude performance 
improvement to previous ones. The anomaly we address is spatial-temporal, which 




W e report our studies on the problem of privacy preserving serial data publishing 
in this chapter, which is organized as follows. Section 3.1 formalizes the related 
concepts and states the problem of serial data publishing. Section 3.2 presents the 
solution called HD-composition and the corresponding analytical study. Section 3.3 
is an empirical study, demostrating the inadequacy of conventional privacy models 
and the cost of the proposed techniques. Section 3.4 surveys the previous work 
related to ours. 
3.1 Problem Definition 
Assume that microdata tables Ti, T2, ..., Tn are generated at times 1, 2，...，n. 
Let TZCj be the snapshot of a publicly available registration list (e.g., a voter 
registration list) at time j. The attributes of KCj include: (1) an individual identity 
attribute TZCj .pid, which is the primary key of TZCj, and (2) d quasi-identifier 
attributes (QID): TlCj.qidi, TlCj.qid2, ...’ and TZCj.qidd. Assume that I is the set 
of all individuals, thus at time j, TZCj corresponds to a subset of I. Tables 1.1(a) 
to (c) are examples of registration list snapshots. Tj can be seen as a snapshot of 
a dynamic dataset T at time j. The attributes of Tj include: (1) an individual 
52 
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identity attribute TJ .pid, which is a foreign key referencing TZjCj, and (2) a sensitive 
attribute Tj.S. Each instance of Tj.S is a sensitive value. Following the literature's 
convention [34], the value in Tj.S should be categorical, while the other attributes 
can be either numerical or categorical. For each individual pi G KCj, Tj.S{pi) 
denotes tts(<Jpid=pi.pid))> the set of sensitive values associated with individual pi 
in Tj. Assume that at each time j, the publisher releases Tj's anonymized version 
Tj to the public. For example, Tables 1.1(d) to (f) are 3 snapshots of T, while 
Tables 1.2(a) to (c) are published anonymized data at times 1，2, and 3. 
Let S be the set of all sensitive values that can appear in the sensitive at-
tributes. In the set S, some values are permanent sensitive values, which form the 
set PS. A permanent sensitive value is a value that will stay with an individual 
permanently. Hence if s is a permanent sensitive value, and for an individual pi, s 
e Tj.S{pi), then for all times f > j, either pi has no record in Tj', or s G Tj>.S{pi). 
The remaining values in S are called transient sensitive values and they form the 
set TS. For example, diseases like Alzheimer, HIV and cancer are incurable and 
are permanent sensitive values, while diseases like Flu, Diarrhea and SARS are 
examples of transient sensitive values. 
Definition 7 (Anonymized Group) At time j, let P{7lLj) be a partitioning of 
the individuals in IZjCj, each partition V in P{7LCJ) is related to an anonymized 
group AQj{V). Each AQj{V) is associated with (1) a unique group ID, and (2) a 
predicate Q on the QID attributes covering the QID values of all individuals in V. 
We also say that AQj {V) is the hosting group of Pi for each pi G V. AQj{pi) is 
also used to refer to pi，s hosting group. 
An example of the predicate Q is a bounding box for numerical QID values. 
In Table 1.2(a), there are two anonymized groups, group 1 and group 2, and their 
intervals of age and zipcode correspond to the predicate Q. 
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Definition 8 (Generalization) A generalization Tj of Tj is generated upon a 
partitioning of IZCj denoted by P{7ZCj). The attributes of TJ include: (1) an 
anonymized group ID gid, (2) attribute predicate set Q for predicates over the QID 
attributes, and (3) a sensitive value attribute S. For every individual pi with a 
tuple in Tj, let V denote the partition in P{7iCj) that pi belongs to, a tuple t* 
in T； is generated by: (1) tlgid = AQj{V).id, (2) t^.Q = AGj{V).Q, and (3) 
tlS=Tj.S{pi). LetTJ.S{Agj{V)) denote U 
PieAGjiV) 
For example, Table 1.2 shows three generalizations: Tf for Ti, for T2, and 
T^ for T3. 
In many applications (such as the medical databases) most of the individuals in 
the registration list will not have any record in a particular data release (since most 
people are healthy). In fact, such absent individuals will play an important role 
in privacy preservation by being possible culprits. Hence, we introduce different 
states of existence for individuals. For pi € TZCj, when there exists a tuple in 
Tj with Tj .pid = pi, we say that pi is present in Tj and also is present in any 
generalization TJ of 2}; otherwise, pi is absent. A special case of absence is when 
an individual cease to exist forever, pi is said to be extinct. W e assume that the 
extinction of individuals is public knowledge. 
Next, we need to clarify the knowledge that an adversary may possess for pri-
vacy attack. Typically, there are 2 kinds of knowledge considered: prior knowledge 
and participation knowledge. 
Prior knowledge is known to the public. At time j, prior knowledge includes: 
(1) all publicly available registration lists (the one at time j is UCj), (2) the 
permanent sensitive value set PS, (3) the published table series {Tf, T��...,T^], 
and (4) the list of extinct individuals. 
An adversary can be familiar with their close friends and have the knowledge 
of their participation information (presence or absence in microdata snapshots) at 
/ 
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any time. This is called the participation knowledge. Different adversary may 
have participation knowledge about a different set of individuals, but fortunately 
the adversary cannot be familiar with every individual thus her/his participation 
knowledge is always bounded. W e assume that the size of any adversary's partici-
pation knowledge does not exceed /C. That is, s/he can know at most /C individuals' 
presence or absence information at any time. 
At any time j, an adversaiy A can use her/his prior knowledge and participation 
knowledge to infer the sensitive values associated with each individual. In order to 
quantify the attack on serial data publishing, we define the term privacy disclosure 
risk. 
Definition 9 (Privacy Disclosure Risk) Let Bn be the prior knowledge at time 
n, and A be an adversary with the specific participation knowledge Pj,. The pri-
vacy disclosure risk at time n with respect to individual pi and sensitive value s 
is given by 
risk{pi,s,n) = m ^ m^^^Prob {p i , s, J\BN, Pa) 
where Prob(pi, s,j\Bn, Pa) is the probability that pi is linked to s at time j given 
the knowledge of Bn and P^-
D e f i n i t i o n 10 ( P r o b l e m ) At any time n, generate and publish an anonymization 
T* for Tn, the anonymization must ensure that \/pi e I，Vs e S, risk(pi, s, n)< j. 
Such a series of anonymization rf，T"2*,...’T^ is called an ^-scarce anonymization 
series. We also say that the anonymization series satisfies ^-scarcity. 
Generalization is one way of anonymization. In Table 1.2，generalizations Tf, 
T2 and T3* all satisfy ^ -diversity^  (^=3) and m-invariance (m=3) but violate £-
scarcity(£=3), as discussed in the introduction part. Yet generalizations Tf, 
and Tg' satisfy not only ^ -diversity (€=3) but also ^ -scarcity (^=3). 
iln this paper, ^-diversity refers to the requirement that in any anonymized group, at most \ / t 
of the records contain any sensitive value v. 
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P I D D i s e a s e . P I D G . I D A g e Zip. D i sease 
PI Flu Pi 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Flu 
P2 HIV p2 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] HIV 
P3 Flu P3 1 [20’ 26] [12k, 33k] Flu 
P5 Fever P5 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Fever 
P6 Fever P6 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Fever 
pr Ulcer Pr 1 [20, 26] [12k, 33k] Ulcer 
(a) Microdata T4 (b) Topmost Generalization T: 
Table 3.1: Example without ^ -scarce Generalization 
This problem is very difficult when the adversary can have participation knowl-
edge of every individual. Generalization is not possible in some cases. A general-
ization T*, is called a topmost generalization if T* has only one anonymized group 
AG where all individuals in T are covered by AG's QID predicate. Obviously, 
if the topmost generalization could not guarantee privacy, then no generalization 
can. In Table 3.1, T4 is the microdata snapshot at time 4，consequent to Ti, T2 
and T3 in Table 1.2，while T: is the topmost generalization for T4. Even if we 
adopt a topmost generalization for each of T\,T2,Tz and T4, we deduce that Tl 
still cannot guard privacy if the adversary knows everyone's participation informa-
tion (i.e., /C=| Uj This is because pa has been known to be absent while 
Pi’P2，P3’P5’P6 are still present at time 4，and one of the two HIV occurrences has 
disappeared. Since HIV is a permanent sensitive value, p4 must be linked to HIV. 
W e can adopt the conventional random world assumption on the probabilistic 
analysis. In serial data publishing, a random world can be defined by a possible 
series of microdata tables, where by possible we mean that the series could have 
been the original microdata tables which have generated the observed published 
anonymized tables and which do not violate the known knowledge. Hence, we 
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P I D D i s e a s e . P I D Disease . P I D Disease . 
Pi Flu Pi Flu Pi Fever 
P2 Fever p2 Fever P2 Flu 
P 3 H I V P3 H I V P3 H I V 
P4 H I V P4 H I V P4 H I V 
P5 Flu p5 Fever Fever 
P6 Fever P6 Flu pe Flu 
(a) Tf (h)Ti n 
Table 3.2: Possible Table Series 
introduce the definitions of possible table series. 
Definition 11 (Possible Table Series) At time n, table series 
Tf, TP} is called a possible table series for adversary A if the following 
requirement is satisfied: 
1. V r j G TSpossibie,� T* is a generalization ofTf and (2) Tf does not violate 
the prior knowledge nor participation knowledge of A, 
2. Vpi G J , Vp5 G PS, if 3j, ps e Tj.S{pi), then > j，either pi is absent in 
Tf, orps£Tf,.S{pi). 
For example, consider the table series in Table 1.2. Assume an adversary A 
have participation knowledge of individuals pi’...，p6. At time 3, besides {Ti, T2, 
Ts} in Table 1.1, {Tf, T^, T^} in Table 3.2 is also a possible table series. 
At time n, the privacy disclosure risk of linking individual pi to sensitive 
value s is: 
risk{pi, s , n) = n m x m&x^nunkiPi, s, j)/ntotai�TS:^ossibie) (3.1) 
where ritotaiC^SAssibie) is the number of possible table series for A at time n, and 
riiinkiPii s,j) is the number of possible table series {Tf，T;f，for A where 
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S e Tf.S(pi). 
In the above we adopt the random world assumption. A possible world is given 
by a possible table series. The risk is related to the number of random worlds with 
assignment of the value s to individuals pi. 
3.2 HD-Composition 
W e propose a generalization technique called HD-composition to solve the problem 
in Definition 10. In HD-composition, each permanent sensitive value holder is 
protected by a number of decoys, which all act like holders to confuse the attacker. 
This basic idea is similar to that used in /c-anonymity and ^ -diversity, yet it is a 
dynamic setting here. It is possible that an individual is linked to more than one 
permanent sensitive values. Thus we shall use a permanent sensitive value as the 
prefix for roles (e.g. HIV-holder and Alzheimer-decoy), because one may serve as 
roles for different permanent sensitive values concurrently. 
Let us formally clarify 3 basic roles in HD-composition. At any time j > 1, we 
specify the time immediately before the anonymization of Tj as time and the 
time immediately after anonymization with possibly some new role assignments as 
time 
For Pi G I and s G PS: if 31 < j' < j, s e Tji.S{pi), then pi is called an 
s-holder from time j : If Vs' € PS, s'车 Tj.S{pi) and pi is not a s-decoy at time 
then Pi is called an s-clean individual. In Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2，we will 
describe when and how to select individuals to serve as s-decoys. 
For example, in Table 1.2, initially no one is assigned any role, at time 1一，p2 
and p4 are and HIV-holders, while pi, ps, ps and pe are HIV-clean individuals. At 
time 1+，after the anonymization process, the roles of HIV-decoys may be assigned 
to Pl,P3,P5,P6-
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3.2.1 Role-based Partit ion 
For the first microdata snapshot Ti, we generate Tf that satisfies ^-diversity [34]. 
Then, at any time j > 1, after is published, before generalizing Tj to TJ, 
the roles are updated as follows. For each pi that becomes s-holder at time j, 
i — l individuals are selected to serve as s-decoys. After roles are updated, we can 
anonymize Tj to its generalization TJ, the constraints of which are specified by a 
basic principle called role-based partition as follows. 
P r i n c i p l e 1 ( R o l e - b a s e d Part i t ion) At time j > 1, each anonymized group 
AG in Tj satisfies the following conditions: 
1. For each permanent sensitive value s in PS, let Nd be the number of s-decoy 
in AQ, and Ng be the number of s-holders in AQ. Then Nd = {i-l) • Ng. 
2. For each transient sensitive value s' € TS, let Ns> be the count of s' in AQ. 
Then Ns' < 全|«4口|，where \AQ\ is the number of individuals that are present 
in AQ. 
By condition 1 in the above, there should always be £ - 1 s-decoys for each 
s-holder. Note that if there is no 5-holder in AG, there should be no s-decoys; 
otherwise, those s-decoys will lose their protection functionality since they can be 
excluded from the possibility of being an s-holders, and consequently disclose the s-
holders they have protected in earlier table publications. Condition 2 requires that 
each transient sensitive value satisfies a simplified form of ^-diversity. Note that if 
the adversary has no participation knowledge the value of \AQ\ can be defined as 
the number individuals in AG, both present or absent. However, if in the worst 
case the adversary has participation knowledge of the individuals then only such 
individuals can help to provide for the uncertainty, and \AQ\ should be the number 
of individuals that are present in AQ. 
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P I D G . I D A g e Z ip . D i s e a s e 
P5 1 [20, 25] [25k, 33k] Fever 
P6 1 [20, 25] [25k, 33k] Flu 
P7 1 [20, 25] [25k, 33k] Ulcer 
Table 3.3: T^ * 
The following lemma shows a necessary condition for ^ -scarcity, which is en-
forced by the role-based partition principle. 
L e m m a 7 Let AQ be an anonymized group at time j. For any s e S, let 
count{s, AG) be the count of s in AG, if ―口》广g) > then risk{pi,s,n) > 
III. 
Proof: At time n, in each possible table series {Tf，Tf，...rg}，some individual in 
AQ will be assigned to each of the s occurrences in AG, that is, Vs G s G Tj{PI), 
for some pi G AQ. If there are k possible series, then the total number of such 
assignment is count{ps,AG) x k. Hence at least one individual is assigned more 
than count{ps,AG) x k/\AQ\ times. Therefore one or more of the individuals will 
be assigned to s in more than \ of all the series. Note that s can be either permanent 
or non-permanent. • 
For transient sensitive values, their association with individuals in one data 
release has no impact on their associations with individuals in another release. 
Since role-based partition ensures ^ -diversity for transient sensitive values, we can 
derive the following lemma. 
L e m m a 8 If the anonymization mechanism follows role-based partition principle, 
then at time n,y s' e TS, VPI G J, risk(pi, s', n)< 
In other words, if there are no permanent sensitive values, -^diversity at each 
release is sufficient for the required protection. From Lemma 8，in order to satisfy 
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the privacy requirement, on top of role-based partition，we only need to make sure 
that there is no privacy breach on the permanent sensitive values, meaning that 
VPI G X and Vs G PS, risk{pi,s,n) < IjL 
Let us return to the example in Table 1.2. After T{ is published, before T《is 
generated, roles should be updated. In order to achieve 3-scarcity, two HIV-decoys 
should be selected from Group 1 and Group 2 respectively. Therefore, HIV-decoy 
candidates , P3，Ps, and pe are all selected to be HIV-decoys. Prom then on, and 
P6 must not disclose the fact that they are not HIV infected. Role-based partition 
will not allow publications like T^ in Table 3.3, since in Group 1 of Tg*, there are 2 
HIV-decoys but no HIV-holder. If so happens that no other individuals satisfy the 
predicate of Group 1，then ps, pq, pj will be identified to be the members of this 
group. Hence, ps and pe will be found to be non-HIV individuals. By excluding the 
linkage of ps and pe to HIV, and by cross referencing table rf，p4 will be discovered 
to be an HIV-carrier with 100% certainty. Thus role-based partition prevents such 
a privacy breach. 
3.2.2 Cohort-based Partit ion 
Unfortunately, role-based partition cannot prevent the linkage exclusion problem 
as shown in our first motivation example in Section 1.2.1. 
Therefore, besides role-based partition, we propose another partition principle: 
cohort-based partition. Our goal is that an adversary could never reach a contra-
diction by assuming that an s-decoy is an 5-holder. Without such contradiction, 
no linkage exclusion will be possible. The solution is to distribute the s-decoys into 
^ — 1 cohorts, and ensure that s-decoys from the same group could never share the 
linkage to one s appearance, which is a basic property if they were indeed s-holders. 
Naturally, all the s-holders can form one cohort too because they can never share 
linkage to only one s. Including a cohort for 5-holders, we have in total £ cohorts. 
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The structure of cohorts is utilized for this purpose. 
To better present the ideas, we first assume no participation knowledge on the 
adversary's side. Also we assume no change in the registration list over time. These 
restrictions will be relaxed in Section 3.2.4. 
Container and Cohort 
From the above discussion individuals would be assigned to cohorts. However, an 
individual that is initially assigned the role of a decoy may become a s-holder and 
in which case it must pass its role onto some other individual who then acts as if 
s/he has been the decoy all the time. To find such eligible replacement, we do not 
enter individuals directly to the cohorts. Instead, we enter a structure related to a 
region, where the region can contain multiple individuals so that replacements can 
be found within the region. Such a region is called a container. 
Defini t ion 12 (s-container) An s_container C at time j is defined by a predicate 
Qc over the attributes of the QID. We say that C contains an individual pi in a 
registration list TZCj if the QID value of pi in IZCj satisfies the predicate Qc-
Definition 13 (s-container instance/owner/s-buddy) A set CI = {C,Po} is 
called an s-container instance, where C is an s-container containing a special 
individual p�which is either an s-holder or an s-decoy, who is the owner of CI. 
We also say that CI is owned by p�. C may also contain s-clean individuals. An 
s-clean individual in an s-container instance CI that has existed since the creation 
of CX is called an s-buddy. 
An s-buddy is a potential eligible replacement for taking up the role of an s-
decoy. Example 3 below helps to illustrate the above definitions. Note that at any-
time, there is a one-to-one mapping between the set of s-holders plus s-decoys to 
the set of s-container instances. 
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At time j, a set C of individuals is called an s-clique if C only contains one 
s-holder and £ — 1 s-decoys. 
Definition 14 (s-cohort/s-cohort formation) A set consisting of a number of s-
container instances is called an s -cohort . An s-cohort formation is a set of 
£ disjoint s-cohorts, in which one of the s-cohorts consists of container instances 
owned by s-holders, and the remaining s-cohorts consist of container instances 
owned by s-decoys. Moreover, in each s-cohort，there are exactly Ns(the number of 
s-holders) container instances. 
Let us see how the cohorts are initialized. At time 2，from every partition 
V G F(Ti), for each s e PS that is contained in Tl.S{AQ{V)), we can form exactly 
count{s,AQ{V)) s-cliques. Vs G PS, £ empty s-cohorts are initialized, and CH{s) 
is a set which stores those i s-cohorts. For each s-clique C, we put the s-holder’s 
s-container instance into the first s-cohort CH{s)[l], and place the £—1 s-decoys's-
containers in the same s-clique into the i — l s-cohorts Ci?(s)[2], ...,CH{s)\l], (one 
for each) respectively. For all s G PS, we construct CH{s) by repeating the above 
procedure. The predicates in the corresponding containers in the construction must 
follow the principle of cohort-based partition. 
P r i n c i p l e 2 ( C o h o r t - b a s e d Part i t ion) At time j’ each anonymized group AQ 
in Tj satisfies the following conditions: 
1. In AQ, if there are m s-holders, then Vi where 2 <i <i, there are exactly m 
s-decoys whose s-container instances are in CH{s)[i], 
2. Let Q be the predicate on the QID values of AQ and let Q be the predicate of 
the container for the container instance owned by any s-decoy or s-holder Pi 
in AG, then Q implies Q. 
At any time j > 1, after Tj_i is published, before generalizing Tj to Tj, the 
roles are updated. Then, fresh s-decoys' container instances are distributed into 
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P I D A g e Zip . Ro le 
PI 23 16355 HIV-decoy, Alzheimer-clean 
P2 22 15500 HIV-holder 
P3 21 12900 HIV-decoy, Alzheimer-clean 
P4 26 18310 HIV-holder 
P I D Disease 
P5 25 25000 HIV-decoy, Alzheimer-buddy 
pi Flu 
P6 20 29000 HIV-decoy, Alzheimer-clean 
P2 HIV 
P7 23 16910 HIV-buddy, Alzheimer-clean 
P3 Fever 
P8 24 15505 HIV-buddy, Alzheimer-clean 
P4 HIV 
P9 22 13055 HIV-buddy, Alzheimer-clean 
P5 Flu 
pio 25 18870 HIV-buddy, Alzheimer-clean 
pe Fever 
p i i 26 25500 HIV-buddy, Alzheimer-buddy 
P13 Ulcer 
Pi2 20 28500 HIV-buddy, Alzheimer-buddy 
pi4 Alzheimer 
P13 23 26950 HIV-clean, Alzheimer-decoy 
P15 Diarrhea 
Pi4 24 25855 Alzheimer-holder 
P30 Flu 
Pi5 21 29355 HIV-clean, Alzheimer-decoy 
P30 2 4 28000 HIV-clean, Alzheimer-clean 
P|RL| 31 31000 HIV-clean, Alzheimer-clean 
(a) 7Z£6 (b)T6 
Table 3.4: Registration list TZLe and microdata snapshot Tq 
cohorts CH{s)[o]{2 < o < £) while fresh s-holders’ container instances are entered 
into cohort C/f(s)[l]. 
E x a m p l e 3 Suppose at time 6, the registration table HCq and microdata Tq are 
given in Table 3.4. There are two permanent sensitive values: HIV and Alzheimer. 
By HD-composition, each individual is assigned some roles, as shown in Ta-
ble 3.4(a). By the container construction procedure ( in Section 3.2.2), the con-
tainers at time 6 are maintained as in Table 3.5, five of which are HIV-containers 
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C o n t a i n e r ( s ) P I D s Ins tances Age Zip. 
CI(HIV) P1,P7.P2,P8 ClhiPl), CIH{P2) [22, 24] [15k, 17k] 
C2(HIV) p ^ Clhjpz) [21, 22] [12k, 14k] 
C3(HIV) P4,PIO CIh(p4) [25, 26] [18k, 19k] 
C4(HIV) p 5 , p n CIh(p5) [25, 26] [25k, 26k] 
C5(HIV) P6,P12 Clhipe) 20 丨28k’ 29k] 
CeCAlz.) P5,P6’P13’P14 C/a(pi3),C/a(pi4) [23, 26] [25k, 27k] 
C7(A1Z.) P12, P15 Claipis) [20, 21] [28k, 30k] 
Table 3.5: Containers and container instances 
叠 旦 旦 ® ^ ^ 
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 
(a) HIV-cohorts (b) Alzheimer-cohorts 
Figure 3.1: Cohorts for HIV and Alzheimer 
(CI to C5), and two of which are Alzheimer-containers (CQ to CJ). Note that 
these containers are defined by the predicates on Age and Zip Code as shown in the 
last two columns of the table. Then, we have HIV-cohorts and Alzheimer-cohorts 
as in Figure 3.1(a) and (h) respectively. Finally, the publication Tq in Table 3.6 
is obtained, which satisfies both the role-based partition principle and cohort-based 
partition principle. 
Container Maintenance 
An s-decoy may become an 5-holder and there will be replacement for such a decoy. 
The concept of containers enables us to easily identify a possible replacement. In 
the next part, we discuss details of how to maintain container instances after such 
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P I D G . I D A g e Zip. Disease 
PI 1 [21’ 24] [12k, 17k] Flu 
P2 1 [21’ 24] [12k, 17k] HIV 
P3 1 [21’ 24] [12k, 17k] Fever 
P4 2 [20’ 26] [18k, 29k] HIV 
P5 2 [20’ 26] [18k, 29k] Flu 
P6 2 [20, 26] [18k, 29k] Fever 
P13 3 [20’ 26] [25k, 30k] Ulcer 
P14 3 [20’ 26] [25k, 30k] Alzheimer 
P15 3 [20, 26] [25k, 30k] Diarrhea 
P30 3 [20, 26] [25k, 30k] Flu 
Table 3.6: Published Table T^ 
updates. 
To simplify our discussion of container maintenance, we make the following 
assumption.This assumption will be relaxed in Section 3.2.2. 
Assumption 1 (Buddy Abundance) At time j, each s-container instance CI 
from time j — 1 contains at least one unique s-buddy Bp{CI) which is present 
and one s-buddy Ba{CI) which is absent. By uniqueness, we mean that for two 
instances Ch and Ch, Bp(CIi) # Bp{Ch) and Ba{CIi) # BaiCh). 
Introducing new s-holder: At any time j if there is a new s-holder pi, then a 
new container instance for pi is added to the cohort CH{s)[l], also one new decoy 
container instance need to be made available from each of the remaining i — 1 
cohorts. 
In the following, we show how to initialize or maintain the s-container instances 
according to how piS role changes: 
[CASE Ml]: Pi is not an s-decoy at time j -1 and becomes a new s-holder at time 
r-
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C = allocateContainer(pi)] CI{pi) <— {C,pi}-, enter CI{pi) into CH{s)[l]. (Note 
that the decoys for pi will be introduced by CASE M 2 or CASE M4.) 
[CASE M2]: Pi becomes an s-decoy that owns a new container instance at time j 
in cohort 7i: 
C = allocateContainer(Pi)\ CI{pi) {C,pi}; enter CI{pi) into cohort H. 
[CASE M3]: an s-decoy pi that owns a container instance CI at time j — 1 becomes 
an s-holder at time j: C = allocate Container (pi) ； CI{pi) {C,pi]\ enter CX{pi) 
into CH{s)[l]. (Note that the decoys for pi will be introduced by CASE M 2 or 
C A S E M4.) 
One s-buddy pi> is chosen from CI to become an s-decoy and the new owner of CI 
(CASE M4). 
[CASE M4]: an s-buddy pi for a container instance CI becomes an s-decoy which 
owns CI. 
In the above, the routine allocateContainer(pi) is to construct a new container 
C which contains pi. 
It is important to note that with no participation knowledge, the adversary 
cannot determine which individual is present or absent. Hence with an s-decoy pi 
in a container instance CI, there is no contradiction from the published data that 
Pi has been present or absent together with the s-holder since the creation of CI. 
It is because when pi is absent (present), there must be some other individual pj 
that is present (absent) and the adversary cannot distinguish between pi and pj. 
Absence of individuals. An individual that is present at one data release may 
become absent in another. It becomes an issue when such an individual has been 
an s-holder or an s-decoy. Suppose pi is present in Tj-i but is absent in Tj. 
[CASE Al]: If Pi is an s-holder at time j - 1, then when it is absent we must also 
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make £—1 s-decoys absent. In order to make a decoy absent, an absent 5-buddy in 
an s-decoy pd's container instance takes over the role of this 5-decoy. pd becomes s-
clean. This corresponds to CASE M4. W e say that the container instance becomes 
dormant. In this case, there is no explicit changes of containers and cohorts. 
[CASE A2]: If Pi is an 5-decoy at time j - 1, then it is replaced by an s-biiddy pb 
who is present in the same container. This corresponds to CASE M4. pi becomes 
an s-clean individual again. 
When an s-holder that has been absent become present, absent s-decoys can 
be made present by switching the 5-decoy role to a present s-biiddy. If an 5-decoy 
that has been absent becomes present, and the container instance should remain 
dormant, then the role of s-decoy is passed to another s-buddy who is currently 
absent. 
Clique Extinction: exit of container instances. If an individual pi becomes 
extinct, it is a special case of absence for pi since pi will never be present in the 
future. Whenever there is any s-holder pi that is extinct and there exist i — 1 
s-decoy container instances with the 5-decoy or any s-buddy that is extinct, we say 
that a clique extinction has occurred, the i corresponding container instances will 
be removed from their respective cohorts together. The secret of the 5-holder will 
be kept forever. 
Anonymization step 
HD-composition integrates role-based partition and cohort-based partition: a par-
tition should be a role-based partition and a cohort-based partition simultaneously. 
With such a partition, anonymization (generalization) is applied, following Defini-
tion 8. 
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Discussion 
Note that an individual pi may be linked to multiple sensitive values in Tj. Suppose 
{si, S2} G Tj.S{pi). Pi will be both an si-holder and an S2-holder. In such a case, pi 
is in both the Si-cohort and the 52-cohort. Similarly an individual can be a decoy 
for multiple sensitive values. 
One basic assumption for the data releases is that the number of permanent 
sensitive value occurrences is not large compared to the dataset size. In the worst 
case, £ — 1 decoys are required to cover each such occurrence, which is possible 
only if the occurrences do not exceed l/i of the data size. This is justified in the 
medical data scenario, where sensitive and persistent diseases are relatively rare, 
with evidence from a real dataset used in our empirical studies. 
Relaxing the Buddy Assumption 
At time j if there exists an s-decoy pi in the cohort formation at j — 1 that has 
turned into an s-holder (CASE M3), if Assumption 1 does not hold for the container 
instance of pi, there will be no 5-buddy found, it is not possible to find a replacement 
for Pi, in this case Pi is pinned as an s-decoy. The s value of pi is suppressed and 
replaced by a transient or non-sensitive value which appears in the microdata Tj. 
When an s-decoy pd is pinned, it will act as an s-decoy until it is extinct. When 
its QID is changed, if necessary, the old container instance owned by pd is replaced 
by a new container instance Cnew which is owned by pd, and in Cnew, Pd remains 
pinned. 
Pinning an individual as an s-decoy may involve a suppression of an occurrence 
of the s value in the case where the s-decoy is actually linked to s. However, even if 
an adversary knows that some s occurrence is suppressed, it is difficult to pinpoint 
an individual that has been suppressed. Hence no extra privacy breach can be 
gained from such knowledge. 
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P I D Dis . P I D Dis . P I D Dis . P I D Dis . P I D Dis. 
P I * P I * P I * P I H I V P I * 
P2 HIV P2 * P2 HIV P2 * P2 * 
P3 * P3 HIV P3 * P3 * P3 HIV 
P4 HIV P4 HIV P4 * P4 * P4 * 
P5 * P5 * P5 HIV P5 * P5 HIV 
P6 * P6 * P6 * P6 HIV P6 * 
(a) Pi (h)P2 (c) F{ (c)P^ {c)Pi 
Table 3.7: Possible Assignments 
3.2.3 Privacy Guarantee 
Next let us examine the privacy guarantee of HD-composition. First, we need the 
definition of possible assignments. 
At time n, T^ is possible table for Tn if T!^  is the n-th table in a possible table 
series. For a possible table T;” the set of individuals that are linked to a sensitive 
value s is called a possible s-assignment at time n. 
Preliminary Analysis 
Let us return to the example in Table 1.2. HIV is a permanent sensitive value 
but Flu and Fever are not. The objective is to publish a generalization series that 
satisfies persistent ^ -scarcity, where ^  = 3. W e first build three HIV-cohorts. In 
this example, each container instance contains only one individual which is also 
the owner of the container instance. Let the three cohorts be (Pi’P6), (P2’？》4)’ 
and (P3，P5), respectively. By HD-composition, the cohorts remain unchanged for 
times 1，2. Let Tf, T2 be the anonymizations based on these cohorts. Given these 
published tables, the adversary may analyze as follows. Prom the registration lists, 
the set of individuals belonging to each group in the two tables can be determined. 
From the group with G.ID=1 in T*, if pi is linked to HIV, then neither p2 nor 灼 
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could be associated with HIV, and therefore from the group with G.ID=1 in T《, 
P6 must link to HIV. Therefore, one possible assignment is that pi and pq are HIV 
carriers. Following this inference procedure, there are 5 possible assignments at 
time 2: Pi, P2, P{, P^ and P^ in Table 3.7. 
Note that there are fewer possible assignments linking either pi or pq to HIV 
(only P3) than that linking each of P2,P3,P4,P5 to HIV. For example for p2, there 
are two such assignments F\ and P[. Under each possible s assignment, to con-
struct the possible tables of Ti or T2 is straightforward: occurrences of the other 
2 sensitive values could be arbitrary assigned to the remaining individuals since 
they are transient. Therefore, totally there are 20 possible tables for Ti, in which 
4 tables link pi to HIV(P；^), 8 link p2 to HIV(尸 1 and P；), and 8 link ps to HIV(P^ 
and P3). Combining the two tables, there are 5(4^) possible table series in total, we 
have 42 possible table series for pi or pe being linked to HIV, 2(4^) possible table 
series for each of P2’P3，P4，P5 being linked to HIV. Thus, the linkage probability of 
P2，P3,P4 or p5 to HIV is 2/5，which exceeds the required threshold of 辨=3). 
However, this result is counter-intuitive, given that generalization is based on 
three cohorts and each cohort has equal chance of being the HIV-holder cohort. It 
is not logical that some individual, such as pi or pq, gets a smaller chance of being 
linked to HIV. 
Trusted Publisher based Analysis 
What is missing in the above analysis is that it does not take into account the 
anonymization mechanism. In our approach, the adversary or the public will be 
provided with the additional knowledge of the HD-composition mechanism. Then, 
the above random possible world assumption is not accurate nor complete. The 
possible world model should be enriched with possibilities or random variables 
made relevant by the mechanism. In particular, the s-cohort formations for all 
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s becomes one of the random variables. The same sensitive value assignment to 
the individuals under different cohort formations will be considered as two different 
possible worlds. The random world assumption is then applied on top of this model. 
With the mechanism knowledge, but not knowing exactly the cohorts, first 
an adversary would need to consider the possible formations of the cohorts. 
From Tf and T&、there are only two possible cohort formations, namely, Fi 二 
{(P1,P6)，（P2，P4), (P3’P5)} and F2 = {P1，P6)’（P3,P4)，（;?2，P5)}. For formation Fi, 
there are 3 possible assignments, namely, {P1，:P6}, {P2’P4}, and {^3,^5}. Each in-
dividual is linked to HIV in one out of the 3 assignments. For F2, the possible 
assignments are {pi^pe}, {P3,P4}, and {P2,P5}- Again, each individual is linked to 
HIV in one out of the 3 assignments. Under each of these six scenarios, there are 
the same number of possible table series by considering all possible assignments of 
the transient values to T^.S{pi) for the remaining pi's. Therefore, by the random 
world assumption, each of the two formation has equal probability, and the number 
of possible table series where each individual is linked to HIV is one-third of all the 
possible table series. 
The above example shows that we should consider possible worlds as defined 
by a possible cohort formation and a possible assignment of sensitive values under 
the formation. W e first define the term possible s-cohort formation series which is 
a series of consistent s-cohort formation from which Tf, ...T* can be generated. 
Definition 15 ( Possible s-Cohort Formation Series) At time n, a series of 
s-cohort formation {Li, L2, Z/3,..., Ln}, where Lj is an s-cohort at time j, is a 
possible s-cohort formation series if and only if the followings hold: 
Let Li = and Lj = {Cj,C^', ...C^'}, 
1. If 2 different s-container instances Ch and Ch occur in Li and Lj, then 
CI\ and CI2 are in the same s-cohort in Li iff they are in the same s-cohort 
in Lj. 
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2. If an s-container instance occurs in both CJ and C( (both are cohorts for 
s-holders), then if po is the owner of the instance in CI, it is also the owner 
of the instance in Ci. 
The first condition in the above governs that a container instance will never 
switch from one cohort to another cohort. The second condition says that for 
5-holder cohorts, the owner of a container instance is never changed. With HD-
composition, the container instance may become dormant but is never removed 
from a cohort until it joins a clique extinction, once a 5-holder is assigned to be the 
owner of a container instance, it will not give up its ownership to another individual 
until the container instance goes extinct. Therefore we have the following lemma. 
L e m m a 9 HD-composition generates only possible s-cohort formation series for 
each s. 
W e call the combination of possible cohort formation series for all permanent 
sensitive values a global possible cohort formation series. A random possible world 
is defined by a global possible cohort formation series G and a possible table 
series generated by G. With the HD-composition mechanism, the definition of 
risk{pi, s,n) is defined to be the fraction of random possible worlds where pi is 
assigned to s. 
T h e o r e m 3 With HD-composition, the risk of any individual pi being linked to s 
at time n is given by 
risk{pi,s,n) < Ijt 
Proof Sketch: Let C!Fpossible be the set of all possible 5-cohort formation series 
at time n. CJ^possible can be partitioned into £ - 1 subsets: where 
CJ^k corresponds to the set of 5-cohort formation series with exactly k cohorts 
which have never experienced any change of ownership for any container instance 
CHAPTER 3. PRIVACY PRESERVATION 74 
that appears at two different times. That is, there ave i — k cohorts which have 
experienced some changes in such ownerships at or before time n. 
The risk of individual pi being linked to s is related to the number of random 
worlds with assignment of the value s for pi. For CT'^, it is easy to see that there 
are k cohorts that could be the s-holder cohort, and there are £ — k cohorts that 
cannot be the s-holder cohort. In CT^, let CJ^p. be the subset of cohort formation 
series where pi is the owner of some container instance CI{pi) in the published 
data. 
Since each container instance conforms to the Cohort-based partition principle, 
and all possible instances are constructed from the anonymized groups in the pub-
lished tables, each anonymized group has the same effect on each cohort. Hence 
each container instance has an equal chance of being included in each cohort. 
• Within CJ^p.，there is a probability of k/i where CU is within one of the possible 
s-holder cohorts, and for each such cohort, there is a chance oil/k where the cohort 
is indeed the s-holder cohort. Hence the probability that pi is linked to s is given 
by k/i X 1/k = Xjl. This probability is conditioned on CJFp., in other words, 
= (3.2) 
Let ProhiCJ^^)=丨•二:^丨.The number of possible worlds generated by 
each of the possible s-cohort formation series is the same because there are the 
same number of remaining linkages of values to individuals in each anonymization 
group in the published tables, and the individuals are not distinguishable from 
the adversary viewpoint. Therefore from Equation 3.2 the probability of pi being-
linked to s at time n is 
le广I 
Probipus.nlCJ'') = Prob(pi,s,n\C:Fkpi) x < 
Since constitute all the possibilities, we have 
e-i 
Probipi, s,n) = Y. s, x ProhiCJ"^) 
k=l 
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e-i 
< Iji X Y.ProhiCT^) = Xjl 
k=l 
• 
3.2.4 Ref inement of HD-composi t ion 
In the previous discussion, for clarity, there is no consideration of QID value changes 
and participation knowledge of the adversary. In this subsection we refine HD-
composition to address these issues. 
QID value updates 
Prom the multiple releases of KC“ one can determine the changes of individuals' 
QID values from time to time, the changes lead to changes in the s-cohorts. Suppose 
Pi has changed the QID value at release Tj so that it is different from that in Tj—i. 
If Pi is an s-holder and, after the QID change, it is not contained in the container • 
instance CN at time j — 1, then a new container instance owned by Pi is created, 
which replaces the old container. If pi is an s-decoy and, after the QID value 
change, pi is not in the original container CN, then CN should still contain an s-
decoy. Hence, the role of pi as an s-decoy is replaced by an s-buddy in the container 
instance. The role of pi is changed and it becomes an s-clean individual. 
Participation Knowledge 
Here we consider that the adversary has the knowledge of the presence and/or 
absence of up to fC individuals. W e replace the buddy abundance assumption 
ill Section 3.2.2 with the following assumption (/C buddy abundance assumption): 
given Tj, and the cohort formation at time j —1, each container in any cohort should 
contain at least /C + 1 s-biiddies which are present and at least /C + 1 s-biiddies 
which are absent. 
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With at least /C + 1 s-buddies present, an adversary will not have knowledge 
of at least one s-buddy Px that is present, with the QID anonymization, from the 
adversary's viewpoint, Px can be any individual present or absent in TJ. Therefore, 
Px can become an s-decoy if needed, and the s-decoy role of Px can also be swapped 
in the future with the s-buddy role of other s-buddies. 
With at least /C + 1 s-buddies absent, an adversary will not have knowledge 
of at least one absent s-buddy py. Hence, py can be the s-decoy who is absent in 
a dormant container instance, and the role of decoy of py can be swapped with 
another s-buddy in the future. 
In case the condition in the K. buddy abundance assumption above is not sat-
isfied, it is possible for the adversary to know everyone that is present, then an 
adversary may limit the scope of possible s-decoy to the current set X of present 
individuals. Therefore, the available pool of s-buddies must be within X、and can 
be further restricted if only a subset of X is present at any time. The final available 
s-buddy will be pinned as described in Section 3.2.2. 
Let us call the scheme of HD-composition with the refinements in this section 
the refined HD-composition, the proof of the following lemma is similar to that for 
HD-composition. 
T h e o r e m 4 Anonymization by refined HD-composition satisfies C-scarcity. 
3.2.5 Anonymiza t ion Algorithm 
Existing anonymization algorithms [14, 30] can be adopted for the task of HD-
composition. The existing anonymization algorithms generate a number of 
anonymized groups, each of which satisfies some privacy requirement such as i-
diversity. In this paper, we can borrow one of these algorithms by making each 
group in the output of these algorithms satisfy the properties of both role-based 
partition and cohort-based partition instead. This flexibility is a good feature since 
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it opens the opportunity of leveraging the known anonymization algorithms to opti-
mize HD-composition. In this paper, we adopt a top-down strategy [14] to perform 
the anonymization algorithm because it is found that a top-down approach often 
introduce less information loss in data publishing. 
Specifically, each time we generate a published table TJ from Tj, we perform 
the following steps. Firstly, for each s G PS, update the £ s-cohorts. Secondly, for 
each s G PS, s-cliques are created from all the 5-holders and s-decoys. If there are 
N container instances in every s-cohort, then we will create N s-cliques. At the 
beginning, all the 5-holders and s-decoys are set as available (not involved in any 
clique). W e perform the following process m times. W e want to form an 5-clique C. 
Initially, we set C = 0. Randomly pick an s-cohort among the t s-cohorts. In this 
chosen cohort, randomly select an available container instance in which the owner 
Pj is picked and inserted into C. For each of all other s-cohorts，we find an available 
container instance and a corresponding owner py which is the closest) to pj, insert 
Pf into C, and mark py as unavailable. The final C forms a final s-clique. Finally, 
with every formed clique as an atomic unit, an existing anonymization algorithm 
is applied to form a number of groups each of which satisfy the condition 2 of role-
based partition. Note that when an anonymized group contains a clique, the QID 
predicates of the container instances (whose owner in the clique) will be implied by 
the QID predicate of the group. 
3.3 Experiments 
All the experiments are performed on a Linux workstation with a 3.2Ghz C P U 
and 2 Giga-byte memory. W e deploy one public available real hospital database 
C A D R M P 3 . In the database, there are 8 tables: Reports, Reactions, Drugs, Report-
^The closeness is measured by Euclidean distance on the QIDs. For categorical attributes, one 
can adopt the distance definitions in [31]. 
^http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/medeff/databasdon/index_e.html 
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Drug, Ingredients, Outcome, and Druginvolve. Reports consists of some patients' 
basic personal information. Therefore, we take it as the voter registration list. 
Reactions has a foreign key PID referring to the attribute ID in Reports and an-
other attribute to indicate the person's disease. After removing tuples with missing 
values, Reactions has 105,420 tuples while Reports contains 40,478 different indi-
viduals. In Reactions, an individual can have multiple diseases, which is quite 
coherent with our problem setting. W e take Breast Cancer {15 occurrences in Re-
actions), Cavity Cancer{1 occurrences in Reactions) and Diabetes{60 occurrences 
in Reactions) as permanent sensitive values and other diseases as transient sensitive 
values. 
Dynamic microdata table series TSexp={Ti, T2, ..., T20} is created from Reac-
tions. Ti is randomly selected from Reactions with a rate of 10%. In later rounds, 
Ti are generated in this way: 10% of the tuples in Ti_i randomly change their sen-
sitive values, 10% of the tuples in Tj-i are removed, and 10% of tuples in Reactions 
are inserted into Ti. Besides, dynamic voter registration list series RLSexp={T^^i, 
冗;C2,...,尺>^20} is made from Reports. IZCi is firstly set as a duplicate of Reports. 
In later rounds, VXi are generated in this way: from T^A-i, vol% people change 
their values on QIDs('i;o/ is a parameter), 0.2% people become extinct, and 0.35% 
people are freshly generated (randomly) and inserted^ . In all our experiments, there 
are 20 publishing rounds in total. 
3.3.1 Failures of Conventional Generalizations 
In this section, we confirms the significance of the privacy breach problems in tra-
ditional generalization principles. W e use ^ -diversity [34] and m-invariance [52] as 
the representative principles, since ^ -diversity is widely adopted while m-invariance 
is the latest work offering protection on serial data publishing. Following m-
4The insertion and deletion rate of registration list is according to the death and birth rate per 
quarter of US. in year 2007, http://www.indexmundi.com/unitedjstates/ 
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invariance, when someone changes one of her/his sensitive value, we treat it as 
an articulate deletion and re-insertion. 
Given TSexp, we adopt the ^ -diversity and m-invariance generalizations respec-
tively. Then, we capture the individuals whose privacy is breached: those with a 
higher privacy disclosure risk than the threshold l/£(or 1/m). Those individuals 
are called vulnerable individuals. It is noted that the vulnerable individuals must 
once appear in an anonymized group linkable to a permanent sensitive value. As 
in Table 1.2, at time 3, pi, ..., pe are all vulnerable individuals: pi, p5 and pe are 
excluded from HIV, P2 and ps are found to have 50% probability to contract HIV, 
P4 is disclosed. At time j, given the number of vulnerable individuals: Nyui{j), 
and the number of individuals once sharing the linkage probability to a permanent 
sensitive value: Nunk(j), the rate of privacy breach is calculated as follows: 
rate of privacy breach at time j = 二”—力、 
NlinkU) 
In Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, we plot the rate of privacy breaches at each 
publishing round in ^ -diversity and m-invariance generalizations, with vol%=2% 
and vol%=b% respectively. Each curve corresponds to the result obtained with 
a different £ or m. From the figures, it could be found that both ^ -diversity and 
m-invariance fail to support serial publication on fully dynamic databases, because 
they result in a high privacy breach rate. For example, when £=5(or m二5)，after 
about 5 publishing rounds, there are more than 90% individuals once linkable to a 
permanent sensitive value suffering a privacy breach risk higher than 1/5. 
3.3.2 Evaluations of HD-Compos i t ion 
In this part, we test HD-composition in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Given 
TSexp and RLSexp, let vol%=2%, we apply the anonymization algorithm in Sec-
tion 3.5 to sequentially compute the generalized table TJ for microdata table TJ. 
In order to well evaluate HD-composition, we examine 4 aspects: the portion of 
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Figure 3.2: Rate of privacy breach vs. round: -^diversity 
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Figure 3.3: Rate of privacy breach vs. round: m-invariance 
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Figure 3.4: Perturbation ratio vs. round: HD-composition 
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Figure 3.5: Query error vs. round: HD-composition 
perturbed tuples, the utility of published tables, the computation overheads, and 
the additional costs for dealing with participation knowledge, as follows. In the 
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Figure 3.7: Computation cost vs. round: HD-composition 
following container size C refers to the number of individuals that are present in 
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Figure 3.8: Effect of participation knowledge vs. round 
the container. Also the default values of C、£、K are 5，4，0，respectively®. 
Perturbation Rate. As described in Section 3.2.2’ perturbing sensitive values 
sometimes is necessary. Thus, we want to investigate that, to achieve ^ -scarcity, 
normally how many individuals' sensitive values should be perturbed. Figure 3.4(a) 
shows the ratio of perturbed individuals among all individuals present in the mi-
crodata snapshot at each publishing round, where we and plot different curves to 
visualize the effects of different £. Figure 3.4(b) presents the results of a similar 
experiment with different container sizes C. Prom both Figure 3.4(a) and (b), we 
can find that at the first few publishing rounds, there is no perturbation at all, 
and the total number of perturbed tuples is tiny compared to the cardinality of 
microdata tables (about 0.02%). 
Utility of Published Data. In this set of experiments, we compare the query 
processing results on each anonymized table TJ and its corresponding microdata 
another suit of experiments, we set default /C to be 3，and get very similar results. 
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table Tj at each publishing round. W e follow the literature conventions [50’ 52, 
48] to measure the error by the relative error ratio in answering an aggregate 
query. All the published tables are evaluated one by one. For each evaluation, 
we perform 5,000 randomly generated range queries which are similar to [52] on 
the microdata snapshot and its anonymized version, and then report the average 
relative error ratio. The results are plotted in Figure 3.5(a) and (b), in terms of 
different configurations of £ and container size C respectively. The results show that 
the data utility does not downgrade much with the increase of publishing rounds, 
nor the container size. Besides, we also compute -^diversity and m-invariance 
generalizations for every microdata snapshot by different £ and m , and the results of 
their average relative error ratio are reported in Figure 3.6(a) and (b) respectively. 
It could be found that HD-composition has a similar performance compared with 
-^diversity and m-invariance in terms of utility. 
Computation Cost. This experiment evaluates the efficiency of our anonymiza-
tion algorithm. First, we vary £ and measure the time spent in generalization phase 
at each round. The effect of different H is plotted in Figure 3.7(a). It could be found 
that the larger £ is, the faster the anonymization will be. The reason is that with 
larger i, the top-down specialization process can stop at an earlier stage and save a 
large amount of time on privacy checking. Second, we change the container size to 
investigate how the container size affect the time cost. The results in Figure 3.7(b) 
shows that the time costs are nearly the same for different container sizes. The rea-
son is that the occurrence of permanent sensitive values is rare, and consequently 
the number of containers (for holders and decoys) are not large. 
Effect of Participation Knowledge. The last experiment investigates how the 
utility and computation cost change if we need to defend against the participation 
knowledge. W e vary the quantity of participation knowledge /C, then at each pub-
lishing round, record the relative average query error in Figure 3.8(a) and plot the 
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computation cost in Figure 3.8(b). It could be found that different cardinalities of 
the participation knowledge do not have drastic influence on the results. 
3.4 Related Work 
Researches on privacy protections for data publishing can be classified into two 
branches. The first branch is the one-time publication. The second branch is 
serial publication. For one-time publication, many privacy models are proposed 
to protect individual privacy. The traditional model is A;-anonymity [42, 30，29] 
which requires that each QID value either appears at least k times or does not 
appear in the published table. However, recently, it is found that /c-anonymity is 
vulnerable to homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack. One of the 
most influential work is ^ -diversity [34], which considers the inference relationship 
between QID values and sensitive attributes, instead of the number of occurrences 
of the QID values only. Since the aim of privacy protection is to guarantee the 
linkage probability between one and a sensitive value is no more than a threshold, 
-^diversity is more meaningful than /j-anonymity. Li and Li [32] also consider the 
inference relationship and propose i-closeness which restricts that, according to 
the sensitive attribute, the distribution of each anonymized group is similar to the 
distribution of the entire published table. 
Some works [34’ 35’ 48) for the one-time publication also consider some kinds 
of background knowledge. In [34], a Japanese hardly suffers from heart disease. 
Martin et al. [35] propose a new kind of background knowledge considering the 
association among individuals. For example, if an individual is linked to a sensitive 
value such as HIV, another individual which has a close relationship with him/her 
must also be linked to the same sensitive value. Wong et al. [48] consider that 
the background knowledge can be the principle of the anonymization algorithm. 
Different from previous works, we focus on the background knowledge including 
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the participation information which denotes whether an individual is present or 
not in a snapshot of the microdata. 
Byun et, al. [6] adopt delayed publishing to keep ^ -diversity dynamically, in 
which the anonymized data will not be published until the inserted tuples them-
selves could satisfy some privacy requirements. Yet the method has several draw-
backs: it only considers insertions, all the publishing histories need to be main-
tained, and delayed durations are not bounded. Xiao and Tao [52] propose the 
m-invariance model to support both insertion and deletions. However, as we have 
discussed in the introduction, both of these works cannot address the problems 
that are identified in this paper. 
Wang et al. [47] considers sequential releases where each release is on a different 
subset of the attributes for the same dataset. Both [38] and [13] present a privacy 
model to protect A;-anonymity with serial publications that only allow insertions. 
Both consider /c-anonymity and cannot be easily extended to the case where the 
inference relationship between QID and sensitive attributes is considered. 
Chapter 4 
Conclusions 
In this thesis, we have studied the two data mining problems - anomaly monitoring 
and privacy preservation. 
Anomaly Monitoring: Targeting typical scenarios of context-aware applica-
tions, we extract a useful and general research problem: monitoring distance-based 
anomalies over moving object trajectory streams, and propose data structures and 
algorithms employing local clustering and piecewise VP-tree based rescheduling to 
efficiently conduct such a task. The experimental results validate our solutions by 
showing both the usefulness of distance-based anomalies and orders of magnitude 
improvement in performance compared to simple pruning approach. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first work that provides efficient support for continuous 
monitoring of distance-based anomalies over trajectory streams with correctness 
guarantee. 
Privacy Preservation: Current anonymization techniques for serial data pub-
lishing cannot support data updates on both QID attributes and the sensitive at-
tribute and none of them consider the effect of permanent sensitive values. This 
paper addresses these issues by proposing a novel anonymization method by role 
composition. Utilizing the assumption of trusted publishers, we present an analysis 
87 
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showing that individual privacy can be guaranteed by our method. In the exper-
iments on a real dataset, we find that our proposed algorithm HD-composition is 
efficient and also can preserve the utility of published data. 
There are some promising directions for future work. It would be interesting 
to extend HD-composition to guard privacy against various kinds of background 
knowledge. One can also explore novel techniques to raise the utility for serial data 
publishing. 
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